Introduction
The purpose of this post is to survey the law on key
consumer remedies in supply of goods contracts under the Consumer Rights Act 2015.[1] By
doing so the aim is to identify potential obstacles to a consumer in claiming a right of repair and replacement and how it interacts with other remedies of rejection, price reduction, and damages, which are highlighted in bold at the end of each section. It is
not intend to answer these questions in this post.
As a matter of terminology under the Sale of Goods
Act 1979 the parties are the buyer and seller; under the Consumer Rights Act
2015 the parties are the consumer and trader.
The law
Repair or
replacement
Repair or replacement is a distinct statutory remedy
for consumers.[2]
There is, however, little case law on this remedy.[3] Under
the Sale of Goods Act 1979, a buyer’s statutory remedies were rejection,
damages, or specific performance. It was not until 1994 that consumer buyers were
granted the additional remedies of repair or replacement and price reduction.[4]
That does not mean the parties could not agree to repair or replacement
themselves.
In recognition of this, the Sale of Goods Act 1979
was amended to acknowledge that asking for repair did not amount to an
acceptance of faulty goods that precluded a buyer from rejecting them.[5] While
this issue was resolved it was not a right to repair or replacement. This
created a separate question as to the effect repair or replacement on the buyer’s remedies if
the goods were repaired to the required standard under the contract. J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd offers
authoritative guidance on this question but the rationales in the judgments of
Lords Hope and Rodger differ in reaching the same conclusion. The judgments of
Lord Mance, Brown, and Scott appear to follow Lord Rodger’s judgment, but do
expressly endorse Lord Hope as well. This may not have been addressed since the
same conclusion was reached, but we shall return to this discrepancy as it may
impact the consumer’s remedies to reject, price reduction, and damages.
The facts involved Mr Ritchie purchasing a harrow,
farming equipment, from Lloyd Ltd. The goods delivered were faulty due to a
vibration occurring when the goods were used. Mr Ritchie agreed to an
inspection, from which it was discovered the vibration was caused by a major
defect. Later, Mr Ritchie was informed that it had been fixed and made ready for
collection. At this point Mr Ritchie did not know what the problem had been. He
asked to be informed of the cause and also to see an engineer’s report. Lloyd
Ltd refused these requests. Although he was later unofficially informed of the
cause, he was not privy to the cause for many months and decided to reject the
goods on the grounds of breach of contract. Lloyd Ltd refuted this, contesting
the buyer had a duty to accept the goods under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
27. They contended that the “effect of the repair … was to make it as good as
it would have been if it had left the factory as a new, correctly assembled
harrow”.[6] The law was clear that asking for repair did
not preclude rejection, but the issue was whether the buyer was still entitled
to reject goods when it was offered back to them fixed. The judgment was made
in favour of Mr Ritchie on the basis of an implied term. The judgments,
however, were at odds with how that implied term came about.
There was general consensus that if goods were
repaired to the required standard, without more the buyer would not be entitled
to reject the goods.[7] There
is no express remedy to repair or replacement that would lead to any other conclusion. The difference in opinion comes
in regarding whether the buyer could reject on the basis of the information not
being supplied.
For his part, Lord Hope considered the implied term
was a necessary inference from the statute that would enable the buyer to make
an informed election between accepting and rejecting the goods. He reasoned
that the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods under the Sale
of Goods Act 1979, s 35(2)(a) while retaining the right to reject the goods but
it is not an election a buyer can be expected to exercise “until he has the
information that he needs to make an informed choice”.[8] He
rationalised this decision by analogy with Clegg
v Andersson t/a Nordic Marine,[9]
which held retention of goods for 9 months did not preclude rejection of the
goods where the seller had agreed to supply information about the fault but had
not yet done so and the buyer had not yet agreed to repair. In J & H Ritchie the repair was carried
out with no undertaking that the seller would provide them with information as
to the nature of the defect.[10]
The lack of an undertaking to do so, according to Lord Hope, meant the term was
necessary, as the information was “obviously needed if the appellants were to
make a properly informed choice between accepting and rejecting the equipment”.[11]
Lord Rodger, however, opined that the request for
repair was an innominate contract, separate from the contract of sale.[12]
The question was then not whether the information was necessary for the buyer
to make an informed election, but whether the information was necessary for the
innominate contract to function. He, and the concurring Lords Mance, Brown, and
Scott, answered this in the positive:
The respondents were taking the appellants' property
to inspect it: an owner who surrenders his property for inspection in this way
can surely insist on being told the outcome of the inspection. More
particularly, in this case, the respondents were the very people who had
supplied the harrow in a defective state. The appellants were surely entitled,
at the very least, to insist on being told what the respondents had now
discovered which they had not discovered before they originally supplied the
harrow. Moreover, a refusal by the respondents' representatives to provide that
information would inevitably undermine the appellants' trust and confidence in
the respondents' due performance of the contract.[13]
Lord Brown added that a buyer would surely be
entitled to some assurances about the repairs carried out.[14]
Lord Mance said it was the natural implication from the separate agreement that
if the seller received such a request for information they would inform the
buyer.[15]
It is submitted that Lord Rodger was correct, while
Lord Hope fell into error. The test for implied terms is one of strict
necessity. There are two reasons to reject Lord Hope’s judgment due to this.
First the implied terms test has been expressed as the officious bystander would
deem such a term obvious so it goes without saying. The classic example is where
a dock nominated for a ship, the dock will be deep enough.[16] In
The Aramis the court held that there
could be no implication if the parties would have acted the way they did with
or without the contract.[17] Lord Bingham said "it would ... be contrary to principle to countenance the implication of contract from conduct if the conduct relied upon is no more consistent with an intention to contract than with an intention not to contract". Effectively, the test would not be satisfied if more than one conclusion is possible. In Steamship “County of Lancaster” Ltd v
Sharp & Co the court refused to make an implication where there had
been clear refusal by one party to such a term.[18]
Such a term arising from the statute is not strictly
necessary. The statutory rules on acceptance are a code stipulating what
amounts to acceptance.[19]
It is possible for a buyer to make an election with or without the information,
therefore the contract can function without it. Lord Hope’s judgment may be
better rationalised on the basis of common law affirmation or simply that by
asking for repair and not being furnished with the information by retaining the
goods a reasonable period had not yet lapsed,[20]
discussed below.
Second, Lord Hope’s implied term adds gloss to the
statutory code of acceptance that is not there. The Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
35(2) precludes acceptance of goods by intimating to the seller they accept or acting inconsistently with the seller's ownership until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to
inspect the goods after delivery to check they are in conformity with the
contract. The buyer may also accept the goods by retaining them beyond a reasonable period without intimation or an inconsistent act. Of course, if the buyer does not possess the information about the defect
the buyer may not know what the fault
is. However, this may be distinguished from knowing there is a fault. A buyer may still inspect goods
and discover a fault, even if they do not know what the fault is. They may then
intimate to the seller they accept the goods or act in a way that is
inconsistent with the seller’s ownership having been afforded a reasonable time
to carry out the inspection. A reasonable period for retaining the goods may also lapse before
discovery of the fault, as in Douglas v
Glenvarigill. Nordic Marine is merely authority for the proposition that a reasonable time may take longer to expire in the absence of information, not that it cannot expire in the absence of the information. Therefore, it is, again, not necessary for the information to
be disclosed to enable the buyer to exercise their right of election as the Act does not require it.
If this is wrong, there are other reasons to reject
Lord Hope’s judgment. First, had the seller supplied the information, the
seller would have complied with their contractual obligations and the buyer
would have no grounds to reject the goods. As Lord Brown noted, by relying on
the statute alone ignores the “agreement under which the sellers were permitted
to take the goods back”.[21]
Lord Hope was saying it is an implied term to enable the buyer to make an
election from their rights but there can be no election to reject where the
seller has complied with their statutory duties.
Second, and following on from the first, is that the
inspection and repair was carried out with agreement from the buyer. Lord
Hope’s reasoning is that the implied term enables the buyer to make an
“properly informed election”.[22]
This is suggesting the buyer could still exercise their right to reject even
after the information is given. The problem with this is acknowledged by Lord
Brown as "a buyer who agrees to the repair of defective goods [keeping]
the seller on the end of a string". By relying on the statutory framework
only the buyer could reject the goods up to a point of re-delivery without regard
to what was agreed between the parties.[23]
Finally, Lord Hope rationalises the existence of
this implied term on post contract negotiations. Yet it is trite law that you
cannot introduce new terms after the contract has been entered into.[24]
The term would have no binding effect unless it was implicit at the point of
contracting.
The position under the Consumer Rights Act 2015
entitles the consumer to repair or replacement. They can claim this if the
trader is in breach of the statutory implied terms[25]
or where there is a shortfall in the quantity delivered,[26]
instalment delivery,[27]
or failure to deliver.[28]
If a repair is requested by the consumer it must be
completed within a reasonable period and without significant inconvenience to
the consumer and the trader must also bear any necessary costs incurred in
repair or replacement.[29]
What is a reasonable time or significant inconvenience is determined by taking
account of the nature of the goods, and the purpose for which the goods were
acquired.[30]
If either repair or replacement are exercised the consumer cannot
require the trader to do the other nor can they exercise any short term right
to reject the goods under section 22 without giving the trader reasonable time
to repair the goods, unless that time would cause significant inconvenience the
consumer.[31]
Finally, whether the repair is successful means whether the goods conform to
the contract.[32]
The significance of asking for repair or replacement
under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 is that it limits the use of other remedies.
It has already been noted that the consumer cannot exercise the short-term
right to reject during this period subject to there being a significant
inconvenience. Furthermore, the consumer can only exercise a final right to
reject or request a price reduction after the trader has had one opportunity to
repair or replace the goods and they still do not conform to the contract;
repair or replacement is impossible or disproportionate; or the repair or
replacement could not be completed within a reasonable time or without
significant inconvenience to the consumer.[33]
1. J & H Ritchie was based on the effect of the agreement to repair on
the buyer’s remedy of rejection. The Consumer Rights Act 2015 gives the
consumer an express right to repair or replacement. How is the consumer’s
express right to repair or replacement affected by the agreement to repair?
2. Might the answer to question 1 differ is there is a material
distinction between the judgments of Lords Hope and Rodger?
Rejection and
Acceptance
If repair is unsuccessful a buyer may wish to seek another
remedy. If they no longer wish to keep the goods they may seek a remedy of
rejection. Rejection may be expressed as either a rejection of the goods or as
a rejection to perform your contractual obligation. Both have the same effect:
the contract is brought to an end. That is the entire effect of rejection.
“When … one speaks of “termination,” what is meant is no more than that the
innocent party or, in some cases, both parties, are excused from further
performance”.[34]
Under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, once the effect of
the breach is known a term can either be a condition or a warranty.[35]
To be entitled to reject the goods there must be a breach of condition.[36]
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 dispenses with this terminology and entitles a consumer
to exercise a right to reject if there has been a breach of the statutory
implied terms[37]
or where there is a shortfall in the quantity delivered,[38]
instalment delivery,[39]
or failure to deliver.[40]
A right to reject may be lost under the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 or under common law rules and equitable principles. Under the SGA
1979 a buyer may either waive the breach of condition, elect to treat it as a
warranty,[41]
accept the breach of condition,[42]
or the breach of condition is so slight it would be unreasonable to reject.[43]
An election enables the buyer to treat the condition
as a warranty by affirming the contract. This was the position at common law
and what amounts to an affirmation is found in common law. It can, therefore be
distinguished from statutory acceptance. Affirmation by election is predicated
on the buyer having sufficient information to make an informed choice.[44] The
information normally required to make an election is that which is material,
which may include the fact they had the right to reject.[45] The
only requirements for acceptance under the statute are either an intimation of
acceptance or an inconsistent act with the seller’s ownership,[46]
both of which are subject to a reasonable time to check the goods are in
conformity with the contract.[47]
If a buyer does neither they will be deemed to have accepted goods by retaining
the goods once a reasonable time has lapsed.[48]
Acceptance and affirmation can further be distinguished by conduct: Statute
limits acceptance to these categories but common law affirmation can extend
further, such as conduct by the seller.[49]
A waiver may also take the form of an estoppel. This
would require conduct or a representation by the buyer that they will not
enforce their strict legal rights, which is detrimentally relied upon by the
seller. This is not like affirmation or acceptance as the conduct or
representation is signalling that the buyer will not enforce their rights to
both rejection and damages. To put it another way, they are not making an
election to affirm the contract and pursue damages, they are indicating they
will take no enforcement action. This would require a clear representation or
conduct to this effect; mere acceptance would be insufficient.[50]
For simplicity, herein it is useful to refer to
acceptance generally, encompassing common law affirmation and statutory
acceptance, and estoppel or waiver to cover all species of how the right of
rejection may be lost, unless otherwise stated. This is in keeping with Carter’s
observation that waiver should not be employed in a legal sense because it has
been used to describe each of these species discussed.[51]
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 does not definitely
stipulate which, if any, of these species of waiver are extant. It is clear
from the Act that statutory acceptance has now been removed and a consumer
automatically has the tiered remedies.[52] The
Consumer Rights Act 2015 does not, however, amend the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
11(2). The Consumer Rights Act 2015 clearly intended to amend the Sale of Goods
Act 1979 insofar as stipulated. If it intended to alter all of the rules on
waiver then it would have expressly done so. That means common law affirmation
by election and estoppel can still prevent a consumer exercising a right to
reject.
As noted above, the right to reject under the
Consumer Rights Act 2015 is subject to a right to repair or replacement. If
repair or replacement is requested before the 30 days expires, the short term
right to reject may not be exercised unless the reasonable period required to
complete the repair or replacement would cause significant inconvenience to the
consumer. If the 30 days has expired then the trader must have had one attempt
at repair or replacement and failed to provide conforming goods, repair or
replacement was impossible or disproportionate, or repair or replacement could
not be carried out within a reasonable time or without significant
inconvenience to the consumer.[53]
1. Based on Consumer Rights Act 2015, s 24(5)(a), does asking for repair
or replacement mean the consumer is bound to accept a conforming redelivery,
regardless of anything agreed between the parties, thereby superseding Lord
Rodger’s judgment from J & H Ritchie?
2. Or will any agreement for repair be considered in whether it amounts to
a significant inconvenience, based on Consumer Rights Act 2015, ss 23(5),
24(5)(c), following Lord Rodger’s judgment?
3. How do other forms of waiver interact with a consumer’s right to reject
where a repair or replacement has failed or not completed within a reasonable
time or caused significant inconvenience?
4. What happens to the right to reject if the consumer makes a second
request for repair after the first one fails?
Price
reduction
A consumer may elect between rejection and price
reduction where repair or replacement fails.[54]
If the consumer does not elect to reject the goods the consumer may now pursue
two monetary remedies: price reduction and/or damages. It would stand to reason
that if a buyer is not entitled to damages where a waiver amounts to an estoppel,
then price reduction would also be unavailable in such circumstances.
Price reduction has its origin in the Roman Law actio quanti minoris civilis.[55]
Generally, it was a unilateral remedy that enabled a buyer to reduce the price
according to the defects in the goods delivered. This remedy has subsequently
formed part of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Art 50. This permits the buyer to reduce the contractual price proportionally
with reference to the value of goods delivered as defective and the value
conforming goods would have had at the date of delivery. By way of an example,
take goods sold for £100. At the date of delivery, had the goods conformed to
the contract, they would be worth £80.
As delivered defective they are valued at £40. The proportional loss is
50%, so the price may be reduced by £50.
English law had not directly made such a remedy
available until 1994.[56]
Since then there has only been two cited case.[57]
Bridge has acknowledged that the common law example of abatement is a
functional equivalent of the price reduction remedy,[58]
but is limited in application by comparison. There was also the possibility of
self-help. Nothing in common law would prevent the parties mutually agreeing to
reduce the price, but had no statutory authority to do so.
Its somewhat short history means the availability of
price reduction is somewhat of an unknown quantity in English Law. The nuances
of common law and judicial interpretation mean complementarities of the English
legal system may impact on its application.
A consumer is entitled to price reduction:
(a)
after one repair or replacement, the goods do not conform to the
contract;
(b)
because of section 23(3) the consumer can require neither repair nor
replacement of the goods; or
(c)
the consumer has required the trader to repair or replace the goods,
but the trader is in breach of the requirement of section 23(2)(a) to do so
within a reasonable time and without significant inconvenience to the consumer.[59]
A buyer would have to satisfy one of these three
elements for a price reduction. A price reduction is defined as “the right to
require the trader to reduce by an appropriate amount the price the consumer is
required to pay under the contract…”.[60] Unlike
the CISG’s proportional reduction test, the UK price reduction is an
“appropriate amount”. The Explanatory Notes to the Consumer Rights Act 2015
state that an appropriate reduction would “reflect the difference in value
between what the consumer paid for and the value of what they actually receive”
but an appropriate amount will “depend on the circumstances and the remaining
functionality of the goods”.
The inclusion of price reduction appears to offer better
rights to the consumer on top of their previous rights under the Sale of Goods
Act 1979. This may make this remedy preferable to the previous remedy of
damages. The first benefit is that no reference is made to the date of delivery
for calculating the value of price reduction. The buyer may simply reduce the
contract price to the value of the goods received. This will protect the buyer
from adverse market price movements where goods have not been rejected. Take the example of the value of
goods that drop from £100 at the point of contracting to £80 at the point of
delivery. The defective goods are defective and are worth £40. The previous
remedy to the consumer for breach of warranty was under common law or statutory
damages.[61]
The consumer could only recover £40 to put them in a position had the contract
been performed. Damages do not compensate buyers for adverse market price
movements to put them in a position had the contract never been entered into,[62]
except in special circumstances.[63]
The consumer would lose out by £20. Under the explanation of “appropriate
amount”, price reduction would enable the buyer to recover the difference
between the contractual price and the value of goods received, which is £60.
The consumer may even be able to reduce the price further upon the explanation
given as to “appropriate amount” if the circumstances disclose that it should.
Second, it appears there is also a unilateral
ability to demand the trader reduce the price. According to section 24(1) the
consumer has a right to require the
trader to reduce the price provided they are entitled to price reduction in
accordance with above.
The ability to shift market price risk back to the
trader while keeping the goods, and the ability to recover a higher amount than
damages, may see price reduction become a common consumer weapon, while damages
will become the exception, as is the practice on the Continent.[64]
1. Will courts permit consumers to use price reduction to take advantage
of adverse market movements?
2. What happens to a price reduction remedy if the consumer makes a second
request for repair after the first one fails?
Damages
The availability of any of the remedies in the
Consumer Rights Act 2015 does not preclude the consumer exercising any other
remedies. This includes damages, which may be exercised in conjunction with any
price reduction provided there is not double recovery,[65]
as is the practice on the continent.[66]
Damages are designed to put the consumer or buyer
into a position they would have been in had the contract been performed. Therefore
the rules in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 permitted a buyer to recover the
difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery and the value
they would have had if they had fulfilled the warranty.[67]
This formula means that as well as price reduction enabling
the consumer to shift negative price movements back on to the trader, the
consumer can benefit from positive price movements. Take the following example:
A consumer purchases goods for £100. On the date of delivery they are worth
£150 but they are delivered warranted at £50. The appropriate amount would only
be £50 if the court disregards market price movements in any formula it
applies. Damages, however, could be reclaimed on top of the £50 price
reduction. They should have received goods worth £150 but only have £100 (£50
goods + £50 price reduction). The additional £50 can be recovered in damages.
One distinction with the Sale of Goods 1979 rules on
damages and any damages claimed for a breach of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 is
that the former are calculated in accordance with the provisions in that Act.
However, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 makes no provision for the calculation of
damages and the Sale of Goods Act 1979 rules on damages now expressly state
they do not apply to the Consumer Rights Act 2015.[68]
That means damages would be calculated under common law rules. These can be quite technical when dealing with issues such as remoteness and mitigation of loss.
1. This may not cause any immediate problems for consumers but if the purpose
of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 was to consolidate the law, removing rules
important for the consumer’s remedies is surely more a hindrance than a help.
[1] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
3
[2] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
23
[3] Lowe v W
Machell Joinery Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 794; Douglas v Glenvarigill [2010] CSOH 14 – as cited on Westlaw; W
Ervine, ‘Cure and Retender Revisited’ (1996) Journal of Business Law 799 – and 1 cited article
[4] Sale and Supply of Goods to
Consumer Regulations 2002/3045, Reg 5;
previously Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 48B, C before repeal
[6] J & H
Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [7]
[7] J & H
Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [15], [34], [54]; See also, CMS Scotland Ltd v ING Lease (UK) Ltd
[2010] CSOH 39
at [153], [182] – where successful repair rescinded the right to reject and
there was an implied term in the hire purchase agreement to that effect
[8] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [16]
[9] Clegg v Andersson t/a Nordic Marine [2003] 2 Lloyd's Rep 32
[10] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [17]
[11] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [18]
[12] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [33]; CMS Scotland Ltd v ING Lease (UK) Ltd
[2010] CSOH 39 at [156] – recognised the difference in Lord Rodger’s reasoning
[14] J & H
Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [45]
[15] J & H
Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [52], [54]
[16] The Moorcock
(1889) 14 PD 64
[19] Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v Lebanese Organisation for International
Commerce [1997] EWCA Civ 1958, [1997]
CLC 1274, 1286
[20] See, for example, Douglas
v Glenvarigill [2010] CSOH 14 – finding that the reasonable period of time
to reject began to run from delivery and had lapsed by the time of repair
[21] at [44]
[22] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [18]; see also
at [16]
[23] J & H Ritchie Ltd v Lloyd Ltd [2007] UKHL 9 at [44]
[25] Consumer Rights Act 2015,
ss 9-11, 13-4, 19, Sch I para 10, 30
[26] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
25
[27] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
26
[28] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
28
[29] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
23(2)
[30] Consume Rights Act 2015, s
23(5)
[31] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
23(6), (7)
[32] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
23(8)
[33] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
24(5)
[34] Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827, 844
[35] Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha [1962] 2 QB
26 – terms may be classified as ‘innominate’ before this point
[36] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
11(3)
[37] Consumer Rights Act 2015,
ss 9-11, 13-4, 19, Sch I para 10, 30
[38] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
25
[39] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
26
[40] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
28
[41] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
11(2)
[42] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
11(4)
[43] Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss
15A, 30A
[44] Corinth Motor Oil Hellas Refineries SA v Shipping Corporation of India
(The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, HL, 398–99; see also M Bridge,
The Sale of Goods (3rd ed,
OUP 2014) 6.121
[45] Corinth Motor Oil Hellas Refineries SA v Shipping Corporation of India
(The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391, HL, 398–99; see also Peyman v Lanjani [1985] Ch 457, CA; Transcatalana de Comercio SA v Incobrasa
Industrial e Commercial Brazileira SA [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 215, 220; AMB Generali Holding AG v Seb Trygg Liv
Holding Aktiebolag [2005] EWCA Civ 1237 at [46]; M Bridge, The Sale of Goods (3rd ed,
OUP 2014) 6.121
[46] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
35(1)
[47] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
35(2)
[48] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s
35(4)
[49] See, for example, Glencore Grain Rotterdam BV v Lebanese
Organisation for International Commerce [1997] EWCA Civ 1958, [1997] CLC
1274, 1286
[50] Ets Soules & Cie v International Trade Development Co Ltd
[1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 129
[51] J Carter, ‘Panchuad Freres Explained’
(1999) 14(2) Journal of Contract Law
239
[52] Consumer Rights Act 2015,
Sch I, paras 10, 24; amending the Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 11(4), 35
[53] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
24(5)
[54] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
24(5)
[55] For a full discussion on
origins, see, for example, J Hallebeek, ‘The Ignorant Seller’s Liability for
Latent Defects: One Regula or Various Sets of Rules’ in J Cairns and P Du
Plessis (eds), The Creation of the Ius
Commune. From Casus to Regula, (Edinburgh University Press, 2010) Ch 8; E
Bergsten and A Miller, ‘The remedy of Reduction of Price’ (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 255
[56] Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumer Regulations
2002/3045, Reg 5; previously Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 48B, C before repeal
[57] Richford v
Parks of Hamilton (Townhead Garage) Ltd
2012 GWD 24-505 (Sh Ct (South Strathclyde) (Hamilton)); Douglas v Glenvarigill [2010] CSOH 14 –
as cited on Westlaw
[58] M Bridge, ‘Markets and damages in the sale of goods cases’
(2016) Law Quarterly Review 405,
416-20
[59] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
24(5)
[60] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
24(1)
[61] Sale of Goods Act, s 53; Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341
[62] Consumer Rights Act 2015
Explanatory Notes p 22 para 103; See also, M Bridge, The International Sale of Goods (OUP 4th ed, 2017) Ch
9.104
[63] Taylor & Sons v Bank of Athens (1922) 27 Com Cas 142; James Finlay & Co v Kwik Hoo Tong Handel
Maatschappij [1929] 1 KB 400, CA; Kwei
Tek Chao v British Traders and Shipper Ltd [1954] 2 Q.B. 459
[64] E Bergsten and A Miller,
‘The remedy of Reduction of Price’ (1979) 27 American Journal of Comparative Law 255, 257
[65] Consumer Rights Act 2015, s
19(9), (10)
[66] CLOUT case No. 935 [Handelsgericht des Kantons Zürich, Switzerland, 25
June 2007]; CLOUT case No. 938 [Kantonsgericht des Kantons Zug, Switzerland, 30
August 2007]
[67] Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 53(3)
[68] Sale of Goods Act 1979, ss 51(4), 53(4A)
