Welcome!

To all those reading this I am David Gibbs; I am a Lecturer in Law at the University of East Anglia.

I created this blog as a general out-let of ideas for my research, as well as keeping those interested up-to-date on my research and general interests.

I completed my PhD thesis at the University of East Anglia in 2014. The thesis was recommended for the award of PhD with no corrections. My external examiner was Prof. Simon Deakin (Cambridge) and internal examiner was Prof. Morten Hviid.
My PhD research centred on directors' duties and company law. The thesis was titled 'Non-Executive Self-Interest: Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Governance'. It was a doctrinal and empirical study on whether self-interest was suitably controlled amongst non-executive directors.

My supervisors were Prof. Mathias Siems, Prof. Duncan Sheehan, Dr. Sara Connolly and Dr. Rob Heywood

All opinions of any existing or future blogpost are my own. They do not necessarily represent the views of any of my associated institutions.
ORCID 0000-0002-6596-8536



Monday, 26 January 2015

Forthcoming Publication

In the coming months I will have a publication released on the director's duty to avoid a conflict of interest. It is titled 'The absolute limit of directors' fiduciary liability for conflicts of interest: The director's perspective'. I shall provide the citation when I have one.

The abstract is below and the analysis incorporates new authorities on the issue from the last 6 years including: FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45; Halcyon House v Baines [2014] EWHC 2216; The Northampton Regional Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling [2014] EWHC 30 (QB); Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910; Ranson v Customer Systems [2012] EWCA Civ 841; Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Company Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1021; Cambridge v Makin [2011] EWHC 12 (QB); JD Wetherspoons plc v Van de Berg & Co Ltd [2009] EWHC 639; and Re Allied Business [2009] EWCA 751.

Abstract

The absolute limits of fiduciary loyalty are misunderstood in the context of directors as analyses focus on the interests of the principal alone. This article will demonstrate that such an approach is inconsistent with traditional fiduciary analysis and that it is the specific undertaking to the principal’s interests that determine the limits of loyalty in a fiduciary relationship.






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