As reported on Westlaw, there have now been 20 derivative claims heard. To keep information updated on this as I write my paper the most recent decision was heard in November 2016, Zavahir v Shankleman [2016] EWHC 2772 (Ch). The claim was refused for a mandatory bar, namely no director would continue the claim when acting in accordance with the Companies Act 2006, s 172, to act in the company's best interests.
This takes the figures to the following:
Permission: 40% (8/20)
Refused: 60% (12/20)
Mandatory Bars: 35% (7/20)
It has been said that the success of the reform would depend on whether the claim was accessible to meritorious claims, so looking at the above numbers may not be particularly edifying. Descriptive data may be more useful if one focuses on those claims that had some merit to them, i.e. that did not succumb to a mandatory bar.
Therefore, the figures would be as follows:
Permission: 61.5% (8/13)
Refused: 38.5% (5/13)
By bringing the claim on to clearer grounds the intention of reform was to create access to meritorious claims, but also deter frivolous ones. By looking at the data on derivative claims, my current working paper is looking to assess whether that has happened.
The investigation is premised on the general concept that while a law may intend to do one thing, the outcome may be different. Take the example of 'criminal conversations', a particular offence in legal history for what is now referred to as adultery. The claim is brought by the husband against the adulterer. While the offence was intended to deter men from having adulterous relationships with married women, the law created incentives for married couples to dupe unsuspecting men of wealth in to sexual relations with the woman to extract compensation settlements from them, either in or out of court. There was such evidence of this in cases such as Cibber v Sloper and Worsley v Bisset. However, in both cases the jury, while finding in favour of the claimants, only awarded £10 and one shilling respectively, to reflect the limited injury suffered.
Moving back in to context, the same can be said of derivative claims. Will putting the claim on clearer footing make it more accessible or will it result in frivolous litigation? Speaking generally, the literature acknowledges that a legal system and its institutions generally need to be aligned if a particular outcome is to be achieved. Otherwise there is a risk in introducing a new mechanism or law that is not aligned may irritate the legal system, producing unexpected outcomes.
Therefore, given that it is generally accepted that the UK legal system and its institutions are generally set up against derivative enforcement, it seems unlikely that the new procedure will enable access for meritorious claims. However, making it clearer when claims can be brought to shareholders might be seen to encourage frivolous litigation where an attractive settlement or other benefit might be derived from pursuing the litigation, even if success is unlikely. Given that 30% of claims so far can be described as frivolous, since they failed to overcome the relatively low hurdle that no director would continue the claim if acting in accordance with s 172, suggests that some shareholders might be doing just that.
This takes the figures to the following:
Permission: 40% (8/20)
Refused: 60% (12/20)
Mandatory Bars: 35% (7/20)
It has been said that the success of the reform would depend on whether the claim was accessible to meritorious claims, so looking at the above numbers may not be particularly edifying. Descriptive data may be more useful if one focuses on those claims that had some merit to them, i.e. that did not succumb to a mandatory bar.
Therefore, the figures would be as follows:
Permission: 61.5% (8/13)
Refused: 38.5% (5/13)
By bringing the claim on to clearer grounds the intention of reform was to create access to meritorious claims, but also deter frivolous ones. By looking at the data on derivative claims, my current working paper is looking to assess whether that has happened.
The investigation is premised on the general concept that while a law may intend to do one thing, the outcome may be different. Take the example of 'criminal conversations', a particular offence in legal history for what is now referred to as adultery. The claim is brought by the husband against the adulterer. While the offence was intended to deter men from having adulterous relationships with married women, the law created incentives for married couples to dupe unsuspecting men of wealth in to sexual relations with the woman to extract compensation settlements from them, either in or out of court. There was such evidence of this in cases such as Cibber v Sloper and Worsley v Bisset. However, in both cases the jury, while finding in favour of the claimants, only awarded £10 and one shilling respectively, to reflect the limited injury suffered.
Moving back in to context, the same can be said of derivative claims. Will putting the claim on clearer footing make it more accessible or will it result in frivolous litigation? Speaking generally, the literature acknowledges that a legal system and its institutions generally need to be aligned if a particular outcome is to be achieved. Otherwise there is a risk in introducing a new mechanism or law that is not aligned may irritate the legal system, producing unexpected outcomes.
Therefore, given that it is generally accepted that the UK legal system and its institutions are generally set up against derivative enforcement, it seems unlikely that the new procedure will enable access for meritorious claims. However, making it clearer when claims can be brought to shareholders might be seen to encourage frivolous litigation where an attractive settlement or other benefit might be derived from pursuing the litigation, even if success is unlikely. Given that 30% of claims so far can be described as frivolous, since they failed to overcome the relatively low hurdle that no director would continue the claim if acting in accordance with s 172, suggests that some shareholders might be doing just that.
Case Name
|
Dismissed For/Allowed
|
Significant Circumstances Considered
|
Bamford
|
Dismissed at court’s discretion
|
Wrongdoer control
|
Bridge
|
Mandatory Bar
|
No reasonable director would pursue the claim;
alternative remedy; company decision; independent views; wrongdoer control
|
Cinematic Finance
|
Dismissed at court’s discretion
|
Majority bringing derivative claim; wrongdoer
control; side-stepping insolvency rules
|
Cullen Investments
|
Permission granted
|
Hypothetical director would question if full and
frank disclosure was given for authorisation; and case was simple on this
premise; significant sum could be recovered based on lack of evidence to
contrary; no basis for lacking good faith; hypothetical director would attach
considerable importance; claim being funded by C so no financial risk to
company and possible benefit; claimant’s action may give rise to action in
own right but this was not a decisive consideration since the defence
necessitated it and as a precaution since the company was entitled to some or
all of the relief
|
FanmailUK
|
Case adjourned
|
Case adjourned
|
Franbar
|
Dismissed at court’s discretion
|
Strength of legal claims; ratification; alternative
remedy
|
Hook
|
Permission Granted
|
Good faith; strength of legal claims; ratification;
Alternative remedy
|
Hughes
|
Permission granted
|
Strength of legal claims; ratification; alternative
remedy
|
Iesini
|
Mandatory Bar
|
Weak legal claims
|
Kleanthous
|
Dismissed at court’s discretion
|
Independent review of whether litigation was
beneficial; strength of legal claims; alternative remedy; and benefit would
be small
|
Kiani
|
Permission granted
|
Failure of defendant to produce any evidence to the
contrary; alternative remedy
|
McAskill
|
Permission granted
|
Good faith; Alternative remedy; director would
attach weight to the claim under s.172
|
Mission Capital
|
Dismissed at court’s discretion
|
Alternative remedy; little weight to a claim for
wrongful dismissal of a director
|
Parry
|
Permission granted
|
Strength of legal claims; ratification; good faith;
alternative remedy
|
Phillips
|
Permission granted
|
Alternative remedy; matter of urgency case was
brought to recover sums taken from the company without good reason
|
Seven Holdings
|
Mandatory Bar
|
Claims did not relate to a breach of duty, care,
negligence or default
|
Singh
|
Mandatory Bar
|
No director would continue the claim if acting in
accordance with s.172; fides of the claimant in question; s.994 more
appropriate
|
Stainer
|
Permission granted
|
Strong grounds that there had been a breach of duty;
strength of legal claims; disinterested shareholders deceived in to approving
the loan
|
Stimpson
|
Mandatory Bar
|
The impact an action would have on the interests of
the employees; claim of little value compared to cost of claim; legal claims
were not realistically arguable
|
Zavahir
|
Mandatory Bar
|
No director acting in accordance with section 172
would continue the claim. If incorrect little weight would be attached due to
the costs involved were less than potential recovery, and there was an
alternative remedy
|
Case
|
Type
of company
|
Costs
indemnity sought
|
Financial
State of the company
|
Shareholding
% (respondent/claimant)
|
Amount
Claimed for*
|
Concerned
a conflict of interest?
|
Length
of proceedings
|
Bamford
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
50/50
|
£3,500,000
|
No
|
1
day
|
Bridge
|
Plc
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
Minority
(1.83%)/Director
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
2
days
|
Cinematic
Finance
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Doubtful
solvency
|
0/100
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
N/A
|
Cullen
Investments
|
N/A
|
No
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
“Scant
evidence”
|
Yes
|
N/A
|
Fanmailuk
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Solvent
|
Majority/minority
|
£70,000,000
|
Yes
|
N/A
|
Franbar
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Solvent
|
75/25
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
2
days
|
Hook
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
Minority/Majority
|
Yes
|
2
days
|
|
Hughes
|
Ltd
|
Likely
|
To
be dissolved
|
50/50
|
£100,000+
|
Yes
|
1
day
|
Iesini
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Doubtful
solvency
|
Majority/minority
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
4
days
|
Kleanthous
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Solvent
|
84.5/15.5
|
£120,000,000
|
Yes
|
4
days
|
Kiani
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
50/50
|
£296,000
|
Yes
|
1
day
|
McAskill
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
50/50
|
£197,640
|
Yes
|
1
day
|
Mission
Capital
|
Plc
|
N/A
|
Solvent
|
N/A
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
N/A
|
Parry
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
No
assets
|
50/50
|
£248,577.24
|
Yes
|
1
day
|
Phillips
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Solvent
|
50/50
|
N/A
|
Yes
|
2
days
|
Seven
Holdings
|
Ltd
|
N/A
|
Effectively
no assets
|
50/50
|
£1,693,212.32
|
No
|
1
day
|
Singh
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent/not
trading
|
50/50
|
£873,000
|
Yes
|
1
day
|
Stainer
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
|
87/0.08
|
£7,000,000
|
Yes
|
1 day
|
Stimpson
|
Ltd
by guarantee
|
N/A
|
No
assets
|
Majority/minority
|
£5,300,000
|
Yes
|
4
days
|
Zavahir
|
Ltd
|
Yes
|
Solvent
£20,000 only
|
Equal
|
£136,000
|
No
|
N/A
|
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