Welcome!

To all those reading this I am David Gibbs; I am a Lecturer in Law at the University of East Anglia.

I created this blog as a general out-let of ideas for my research, as well as keeping those interested up-to-date on my research and general interests.

I completed my PhD thesis at the University of East Anglia in 2014. The thesis was recommended for the award of PhD with no corrections. My external examiner was Prof. Simon Deakin (Cambridge) and internal examiner was Prof. Morten Hviid.
My PhD research centred on directors' duties and company law. The thesis was titled 'Non-Executive Self-Interest: Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Governance'. It was a doctrinal and empirical study on whether self-interest was suitably controlled amongst non-executive directors.

My supervisors were Prof. Mathias Siems, Prof. Duncan Sheehan, Dr. Sara Connolly and Dr. Rob Heywood

All opinions of any existing or future blogpost are my own. They do not necessarily represent the views of any of my associated institutions.
ORCID 0000-0002-6596-8536



Friday, 30 October 2015

Derivative Claims: Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121

Cases are slowly filtering through on the new derivative claim procedure as I work on my British Academy project on the subject. Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121. Bridge is the 18th derivative claim to be heard under the Companies Act 2006, part 11, and the 17th of note for my empirical study, since FanmailUK.com Ltd v Cooper [2008] EWHC 2198 was adjourned. (NB: table updated 11th Dec 2015 to incorporate 18th case Hook v Sumner [2015] Unreported)

The relevant factors from Bridge are detailed below, including practical circumstances and outcome. The particular points of note from this case relate to: 1) information asymmetries between weaker and stronger parties; 2) statutory procedure; 3) wrongdoer control; and 4) it involved a plc.

I will not say too much about these but briefly outline the points:

1) Information asymmetries
This was brought by a minority shareholder, Bridge, who owned 1.83% in an AIM company. He appeared as litigant in person but failed to substantiate any of his claims against the four directors since he had no proof of any of his claims nor could he direct any of his claims against any particular director. The judge (at [76]) was highly critical of this noting Bridge's submission that the directors were "all in it together" as insufficient for establishing a cause of action against all four. He also noted that Bridge was 'a highly opinionated individual who is incapable of any objective analysis of evidence placed before him' (at [85]).

Bridge surely should have taken legal advice but his lack of any evidence is a telling problem with derivative claims. His claims were severe, despite not substantiated, and the judge noted that he might have a remedy for unfair prejudice. He did also have the support of a further 4 minority shareholders as the claim progressed. Therefore, the information asymmetries that exist between shareholders and directors/controllers can be a difficult obstacle to seeking redress through the courts since it is difficult to turn suspicions in to substantive arguments.

2) Statutory Procedure
This links to a second point where one might be critical of the court for not following the statutory procedure. At [98] the judgment notes that Bridge should have seen his claim was "doomed" to failure. Why did it get this far then where time and expense of the company was taken up? The judge noted that it was unlikely that there was even a prima facie case but seemed very confused as to what was required for a prima facie case based on his citation of the incorrect statement from Stimpson on establishing one. In Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072, as cited by Bridge, it was said by Judge Pelling that in considering whether there was a prima facie case that the court was bound to consider those factors in section 263(3) and (4) and all other relevant circumstances. This is wrong. A prima facie case is set out in s.261 that it must be: 1) a cause of action vested in the company; 2) in relation to a breach of duty, trust, negligence or default; and 3) brought by a shareholder. The discretion is for part two.

The judgment is littered with contradictions by the judge. Despite citing Stimpson he had earlier cited Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (at [13]-[15]), which is the correct authority for the statutory procedure, where it was noted that at the second stage, something more is needed than a prima facie case to satisfy the court that permission should be given.

Therefore, in one part of the judgment the judge claims a prima facie case is about the whole circumstances of the case, whereas earlier he recognises that the procedure is two distinct parts.

This contradiction is followed by failing to hear the ex parte application separately, describing it as pragmatic to do so (at [9]). It is difficult to see how it is pragmatic to dispense with the need for establishing a prima facie case and involving the company when the judge later uses terminology such as the claim was 'doomed' and the claimant had failed to clearly demonstrate a prima facie case since Bridge could not direct his claims at any director in particular or submit them in the form of breaches covered by the Act.

By not hearing an ex parte application the company was involved unnecessarily, which is what is meant to be avoided by having an ex parte application. Both Stimpson and Bridge failed to hear a prima facie case but both were dismissed for mandatory bars. Both stated that not hearing the first stage was pragmatic but do not cite any authority for judges being permitted to avoid a statutory procedure on the basis of pragmatism.

3) Wrongdoer control
This case revisits the issue of wrongdoer control and confirms that wrongdoer control is not a bar to claim but can form part of the discretion when determining whether to grant permission. In this case, the judge found no reason why the company should not pursue this claim if it wished to do so, since independent shareholders did not support the claim nor did the company.

4) Plc
The final point is that this was a public limited company. It serves as some anecdotal evidence of attempts at frivolous litigation and the wider availability of the derivative claim itself. The fact the claim got as far as it did might cause some minor concern for companies.

Figures and tables updated 11th Dec 2015.

Therefore from the 18 cases the following stats on derivative claims are:
Prima Facie Case: 100% (18/18)
Mandatory Bars: 27.78%% (5/18)
Permission Refused Discretion: 38.46% (5/13)
Permission Allowed Discretion: 61.54% (8/13)
Permission Refused Overall: 55.56% (10/18)
Permission Granted Overall: 44.44% (8/18)


Case Name
Dismissed For/Allowed
Significant Circumstances Considered
Bamford
Dismissed at court’s discretion
Wrongdoer control
Bridge
Mandatory Bar
No reasonable director would pursue the claim; alternative remedy; company decision; independent views; wrongdoer control
Cinematic Finance
Dismissed at court’s discretion
Majority bringing derivative claim; wrongdoer control; side-stepping insolvency rules
Cullen Investments
Permission granted
Hypothetical director would question if full and frank disclosure was given for authorisation; and case was simple on this premise; significant sum could be recovered based on lack of evidence to contrary; no basis for lacking good faith; hypothetical director would attach considerable importance; claim being funded by C so no financial risk to company and possible benefit; claimant’s action may give rise to action in own right but this was not a decisive consideration since the defence necessitated it and as a precaution since the company was entitled to some or all of the relief
FanmailUK
Case adjourned
Case adjourned
Franbar
Dismissed at court’s discretion
Strength of legal claims; ratification; alternative remedy
Hook
Permission Granted
Good faith; strength of legal claims; ratification; Alternative remedy
Hughes
Permission granted
Strength of legal claims; ratification; alternative remedy
Iesini
Mandatory Bar
Weak legal claims
Kleanthous
Dismissed at court’s discretion
Independent review of whether litigation was beneficial; strength of legal claims; alternative remedy; and benefit would be small
Kiani
Permission granted
Failure of defendant to produce any evidence to the contrary; alternative remedy
McAskill
Permission granted
Good faith; Alternative remedy; director would attach weight to the claim under s.172
Mission Capital
Dismissed at court’s discretion
Alternative remedy; little weight to a claim for wrongful dismissal of a director
Parry
Permission granted
Strength of legal claims; ratification; good faith; alternative remedy
Phillips
Permission granted
Alternative remedy; matter of urgency case was brought to recover sums taken from the company without good reason
Seven Holdings
Mandatory Bar
Claims did not relate to a breach of duty, care, negligence or default
Singh
Mandatory Bar
No director would continue the claim if acting in accordance with s.172; fides of the claimant in question; s.994 more appropriate
Stainer
Permission granted
Strong grounds that there had been a breach of duty; strength of legal claims; disinterested shareholders deceived in to approving the loan
Stimpson
Mandatory Bar
The impact an action would have on the interests of the employees; claim of little value compared to cost of claim; legal claims were not realistically arguable

Case
Type of company
Costs indemnity sought
Financial State of the company
Shareholding % (respondent/claimant)
Amount Claimed for*
Concerned a conflict of interest?
Length of proceedings
Bamford
Ltd
Yes
Solvent
50/50
£3,500,000
No
1 day
Bridge
Plc
Yes
Solvent
Minority (1.83%)/Director
N/A
Yes
2 days
Cinematic Finance
Ltd
N/A
Doubtful solvency
0/100

N/A
Yes
N/A
Cullen Investments
N/A
No
N/A
N/A
“Scant evidence”
Yes
N/A
Fanmailuk
Ltd
N/A
Solvent
Majority/minority
£70,000,000
Yes
N/A
Franbar
Ltd
N/A
Solvent
75/25
N/A
Yes
2 days
Hook
Ltd
Yes
Solvent
Minority/Majority

Yes
2 days
Hughes
Ltd
Likely
To be dissolved
50/50
£100,000+
Yes
1 day
Iesini
Ltd
N/A
Doubtful solvency
Majority/minority
N/A
Yes
4 days
Kleanthous
Ltd
N/A
Solvent
84.5/15.5
£120,000,000
Yes
4 days
Kiani
Ltd
Yes
Solvent
50/50
£296,000
Yes
1 day
McAskill
Ltd
Yes
Solvent
50/50
£197,640
Yes
1 day
Mission Capital
Plc
N/A
Solvent
N/A
N/A
Yes
N/A
Parry
Ltd
N/A
No assets
50/50
£248,577.24
Yes
1 day
Phillips
Ltd
N/A
Solvent
50/50
N/A
Yes
2 days
Seven Holdings
Ltd
N/A
Effectively no assets
50/50
£1,693,212.32
No
1 day
Singh
Ltd
Yes
Solvent/not trading
50/50
£873,000
Yes
1 day
Stainer
Ltd
Yes
Solvent
87/0.08
£7,000,000
Yes
1 day
Stimpson
Ltd by guarantee
N/A
No assets
Majority/minority
£5,300,000
Yes
4 days

Friday, 2 October 2015

Volkswagen: Corporate law and governance failings?

Now, you might have been living under a rock if you have not noticed the on-going scandal, or perhaps disaster, at Volkswagen. Normally, a corporate scandal would not get me in enough of a bind to write a post about it, because it has become something of a regularity in one sector or another. So why have I merited this one for attention.

Well, it was after the comments from one of its directors, Olaf Lies, that I decided to write a short piece here. See here for a report and here for analysis. Yes, Mr Lies is one of VW's directors on the supervisory board. This is not the kind of stuff you can make up (albeit this BBC News reporter here humorously goes to great lengths to pronounce his surname how it should be, at around 1:20). It was his comments that particularly got me motivated.

My interest started when Martin Winterkorn, former CEO of Volkswagen, resigned in wake of the crisis stating that he was "not aware of any wrongdoing on my part" and was stepping down in the best interests of the company. He also noted he was "shocked" and the firm needed a "fresh start". Now I am pretty sure most articles on the subject of his resignation could have dispensed with such lengthy pieces to simply state: "shock horror! CEO denies knowing what is going on in the company...again". I for one have had enough of these CEO's claiming they knew nothing and desperately trying to cling to power! Remember Bob Diamond of Barclays anyone?

Many have commented on Winterkorn's attention to detail, so I would certainly agree that if he didn't know, he should have. He has also previously been VW's head of Group Quality Assurance and been in the car industry for over 20 years. But let's even say he genuinely did not know, what is he paid this much money for to do? (in case you were wondering, in 2014 Winterkorn received around 15m EUR in remuneration, see here and below). Selling cars is what VW do, and he did not know. When he found out, he described himself as shocked. At least stand up and acknowledge your own failings of not providing appropriate oversight within your company. It is the company you control and the buck stops there. The whole point of having separate legal personality for companies was to stop shareholders, who did not run the company, being personally responsible for the decisions of others. Yet here we have a controller denying responsibility for his own job and ultimately it is the shareholders feeling the pinch due to tumbling share prices.

Yet I get distracted. From Winterkorn then we get a statement from Mr Lies, claiming those responsible should be criminally liable. It might as well be an admission of guilt, or at least unlawfulness, because you as a board member are responsible for the company you control and the people you delegate to. It is you Mr Lies and other board members who must take responsibility for failing in providing that oversight. You are a supervisory board member, but where was the supervision for the 400,000 EUR that you receive? (NB: the majority of his fee does go to the state of Lower Saxony) Whilst others might have been complicit in the scandal it is another thing to try and shift all the blame on to the employees who were most likely working under onerous targets set by, yes, the board and senior managers.

Mr Lies openly admits to only having just found out about the problems in the "last board meeting". But Mr Lies is a well connected man as the economy minister of Lower Saxony where VW is based. Is it plausible for a man of his position not to have known. Perhaps he did not know because his workload is too demanding. Mr Lies hold 5 other directorships as well as being the economy minister and a board member at VW, see here. The German Corporate Governance Code permits a supervisory board member to have a maximum of 10 additional appointments but this must raise serious questions about that provision. Or perhaps the board was simply too large for anyone to do anything? The supervisory board has 20 members. If the company is forced to trim the fat surely it should start from the top? Perhaps I am optimistic in ignoring the fact the savings that will have to be made will be more likely borne by employees, shareholders, creditors and customers?

Sure Winterkorn has lost his position and Lies might lose his, but this is minor in comparison in respect of what will happen to these other groups of individuals. Lies still holds several other positions to supplement his income. Winterkorn is listed as a board member at Bayern Munich in VW's 2014 annual report. Not to mention his hefty remuneration again, is probably enough to keep him going, which I have copied here.

  MARTIN WINTERKORN
  Chairman of the Board of Management, Research and Development
     
€ 2014 2013
     
Fixed remuneration 1,617,025 1,486,525
Fringe benefits 300,453 421,337
Total 1,917,478 1,907,862
One-year variable remuneration 3,148,000 3,001,000
Multiyear variable remuneration 10,796,000 10,097,000
Business performance bonus (two-year period) 6,296,000 6,002,000
LTI (four-year period) 4,500,000 4,095,000
Total 15,861,478 15,005,862
Pension expense 0 0
Total remuneration 15,861,478 15,005,862


So in summation, corporate law and governance is exposed. Law in its failings to punish the right people, and governance for not incentivising people sufficiently.  

Monday, 7 September 2015

Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Opportunities

Following on from my previous post about my publication on conflicts of interest...

This publication was aimed at addressing some of the uncertainty in company law concerning the director's duty under section 175 to avoid a conflict of interest. From my perspective the courts and academics have, in places, whilst in most cases reaching the correct conclusions, have done so through unorthodox means by trying to assess whether there has been a breach of duty by looking at the issue from the company's perspective. By this I mean that they analyse whether a breach has occurred by asking if the company was interested in the opportunity. This is not akin to the traditional orthodox approach where the issue, in other cases of fiduciary jurisdiction, is analysed by looking at what the individual took responsibility for. Thus, one must approach the question from the director's perspective and ask what interests of the principal did the director take responsibility for? Therefore, looking at it from the director's perspective.

I was critical of attempts by others to characterise this in the form of implied terms, competing companies and scope of business tests. All rather vague terms and still looking at it from the company's perspective since what the company's scope of business is, for example, may say little about the director's responsibility to the company's interests. Requiring a director to suspend self-interest where they had no responsibility for the interest complained of would be highly unjust and beyond the purpose of the duty.

It was the purpose of my article to assert that position rather than primarily critique the work of others. During the writing up of this piece, Lim's work on the same topic, claiming a 'new analytical framework' in 2013, was published and offered a different approach to the one I proposed. Here I plan to go through some of this work and offer some views on the supposed 'new analytical framework'.

Setting the Scene
To set the scene for his new framework, Lim juxtaposed the supposed strict and flexible positions of fiduciary jurisdiction. The strict approach is well known: fiduciaries must not allow personal interests to conflict with the principal's. Currently, I am working on a collaborative piece on how liability may be avoided for those in a fiduciary position but the strict approach is clear that there simply must not be a conflict. Honesty, good faith, knowledge, ownership and the like are no excuse for a breach.

Lim then notes the flexible approach, and arguably simply what his argument is. That the courts will undergo a fact finding mission to decide 'holistically' if the director has breached their duty. There is not one UK case that has adopted this approach and so his citations here are misguided in respect of the primary sources. The cases cited all concerned resigned directors where a fact sensitive approach is taken to determine if the director was prompted or influenced to resign because of the opportunity, but the assessment of a conflict is still strict. He cites Lowry and Edmunds' work as evidence for this flexible approach and his arguments therein are similar to those put forward there.

This sets the scene for Lim's analysis in trying to consider, under s.175(4)(a), in what situations can a situation not reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict'. To my mind the answer is straightforward. Those interests not taken responsibility for. The Act was a partial codification and looking at the old common law, and even the new cases post 2008, liability is avoided when it is demonstrated they did not have responsibility for the particular interest complained of and thus cannot reasonably be regarded as a conflict. Lim's error is to forget the nature of the codification as partial and tried to adopt normal rules of statutory interpretation despite this. Phrases such as 'reasonably give rise to a conflict' and 'real sensible possibility of a conflict' only serve to obscure the matter in favour of the fiduciary, something the courts have never been too keen on.

To support his analysis in assessing reasonableness under s.175(4)(a), he puts forward three different situations: 1) where the company has considered and rejected the opportunity in question on a bona fide basis. Anyone who knows anything about conflicts of interest, will already know this argument is well rehearsed after the decision in Peso Silver Mines and has never been adopted in England. Lim offers no new analysis here; 2) the situation concerning the company's scope of business if the opportunity is discovered pre-resignation. As mentioned above, I asserted in my own piece why the scope of business test is wrong in the context of directors, but the argument for a scope of business test was put forward much more coherently by Kershaw in his article where he tried to assert ownership type rights over opportunities that fell within the company's scope of business, albeit this view has been rejected by the Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures. It is this second category in Lim's article that is most troublesome; 3) the situation where directors have resigned where he tried to assert a 'maturing business opportunity' test, again something not adopted in England and is used only as one factor in determining why the director resigned and not whether there was a conflict.

First I will consider Lim's assessment of s.175(4)(a) before looking at some of these situations. I do not plan to make this an in-depth analysis, but only to point to some serious flaws in the analysis from Lim that should be addressed.

S.175(4)(a)

The argument suggesting a more permissive standard of liability comes from an interpretation of the 2006 Act. Lim’s submission that the omission of the word “would" from the Companies Act 2006, s. 175(2), where it states ‘This [the duty] applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity)’ (emphasis added), means that upon a literal interpretation a company that is unwilling (would) to pursue an opportunity, rather than incapable (could), would mean a director can pursue it personally is unlikely. This is because first and foremost the duties in Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006 are a general statement. The general statement was adopted, inter alia, to allow the courts to develop duties that are not “well-settled”. It is not a precise definition of when the duty will be breached. The omission of the word “would” then does not mean such circumstances of unwillingness, where the company would not pursue the opportunity, are precluded. This can be supported by Lord Goldsmith’s approval of Lord Upjohn’s judgment in Boardman that ‘rules of equity have to be applied to such a great diversity of circumstances that they can be stated only in the most general terms and applied with particular attention to the exact circumstances of each case’. Therefore cases such as Boardman and Regal, which are examples of when a principal has been unwilling rather than incapable of pursuing an opportunity, are still to be followed. A director cannot defend a claim by arguing unwillingness on the part of the company, as it would permit the director to act with self-regard ahead of their undertaking and thus not fulfil the purpose of the duty. 



Scope of business
The arguments for a scope of business test put forward by Lim needed greater consideration and support. Lim makes no attempt to define scope of business, makes analogies with partners, which it is well known you do not do in fiduciary analysis, makes practical assertions with no support for them, and asserts implied terms without acknowledging the case law in full.

The basics for scope of business come from partnership law, not company law. The idea is that a conflict can be avoided by a director if the opportunity falls outside the company's scope of business. As the argument goes in my article an analogy cannot be drawn with partnership law since a partner's fiduciary duty is circumscribed by the partnership agreement or any responsibility beyond that determined by fact. A director's duty is not circumscribed by the company's constitution since it is open to any business. This is the argument put forward in the case of O'Donnell v Shanahan. Lim and I agree that the duty is fact sensitive and not determined solely by constitution or partnership agreement. Thus in partnership law the partners' responsibility can be ascertained by looking at the partnership agreement but it is by no means comprehensive. A company's constitution is of little help since a company is open to any business and thus one must simply look to the facts to determine responsibility. However, Lim asserts that the scope of business can be determined by the circumstances. Yet this is not clear, that he is saying that the fiduciary's liability is determined by the circumstances i.e. their responsibility, but then says it can be determined by the company's scope of business but makes no attempt to say why the company's scope of business is the limit of their responsibility beyond drawing a very thin comparison with partners. He argues that the scope of business can be determined by looking at the corporate documents and this is his main practical argument failing. He assumes everything a company does, can do, or is planning on doing is published in corporate documents. He ignores a glaring issue of commercially sensitive information. He makes no attempt to define scope of business. He ignores the fact the board do not know everything the company is doing, thus not everything it does will be in its corporate documents. He makes no attempt to say which corporate documents he is talking about. 

I use a couple of practical examples in my article in relation to Apple and Tesco. The basics being that if a conflict can be avoided if the opportunity cannot be said to fall within the company's scope of business as determined by corporate documents then does this mean Apple directors can pursue smart watch technology before they announce it in corporate documents? Does it mean Tesco directors can pursue opportunities in designer fashionwear since the company only produced retail fashion clothes. Does this then mean a director can postpone publication of corporate documents until they pursue the opportunity? What about companies looking to purchase raw materials for production? Are they in competition if one director looking to buy wood for furniture for their company diverts an opportunity to buy wood for paper manufacture? These points clearly show how impractical Lim's arguments are. Legally, they are also flawed since it is asserting liability on the basis of the company's interests and not the interests the director took responsibility for. The prophylactic concerns would arise if a scope of business test is adopted for directors since they can try and manipulate their stronger position to make it appear as if they were not conflicted with their responsibility if a strict approach is not adopted.

What the director takes responsibility for may be wider or narrower than the company's scope of business and should not be used for directors. It is used for partners since the partnership agreement is generally what they take responsibility for.

Lim tries to assert that, failing this, the scope of business test could be an implied term in to the agreement and thus asserting a contract first approach, which removes loyalty for interests outside the scope of business. I have cited several cases in my article that show this is a very narrow exception that would not apply in this context. I have also noted that the impact a wide interpretation of the duty would not impact greatly on multiple directorships, which Lim seems to think will happen.

Maturing Business Opportunity
This argument is in respect of resigned directors but Lim ignores the fact the assessment of whether the opportunity is maturing is done to ascertain the director's state of mind as to whether they were prompted or influenced to resign and not to determine if there was a conflict. The assessment of facts in cases where a director has resigned often obscures this underlying premise and leads to these erroneous analyses. Thus Lim asserting the maturing business opportunity test has been adopted by many cases is wrong. They have done no such thing. When assessing a conflict for resigned directors it is still strict. If they had the responsibility to do it then they must be free from self-interest. They cannot learn of an opportunity and then resign to try and obtain the opportunity on the basis it was not 'maturing' as it would go against the prophylactic concerns of the duty. Lionel Smith probably said it best when he noted in 'motive not the deed' that the status as a resigned director was a 'red herring'.

One could again pick up Lim's vague terminology. What exactly is a 'maturing business opportunity'? It is odd to me that for directors there has been this adoption of strange and vague terms to obscure what should be a straightforward analysis as it is in other types of fiduciary relationships.

The term fiduciary and what it means has become bogged down in vague terminology much like the corporate veil was before Prest v Petrodel. The new analytical framework has done little to remove that obscurity and, if anything, has added to it. I hope my ongoing work will highlight this unnecessary obscurity and assert some more straightforward analyses.


Wednesday, 22 July 2015

New Publication

My recent article has now been published in the Company Lawyer. The full reference is:

D Gibbs, 'The absolute limit of directors' fiduciary liability for conflicts of interest: the director's perspective' (2015) 36(8) Company Lawyer 231-244

More to follow...