Welcome!

To all those reading this I am David Gibbs; I am a Lecturer in Law at the University of East Anglia.

I created this blog as a general out-let of ideas for my research, as well as keeping those interested up-to-date on my research and general interests.

I completed my PhD thesis at the University of East Anglia in 2014. The thesis was recommended for the award of PhD with no corrections. My external examiner was Prof. Simon Deakin (Cambridge) and internal examiner was Prof. Morten Hviid.
My PhD research centred on directors' duties and company law. The thesis was titled 'Non-Executive Self-Interest: Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Governance'. It was a doctrinal and empirical study on whether self-interest was suitably controlled amongst non-executive directors.

My supervisors were Prof. Mathias Siems, Prof. Duncan Sheehan, Dr. Sara Connolly and Dr. Rob Heywood

All opinions of any existing or future blogpost are my own. They do not necessarily represent the views of any of my associated institutions.
ORCID 0000-0002-6596-8536



Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corporate Governance. Show all posts

Monday, 28 November 2016

Theresa May on Corporate Governance: A misguided approach?

When last I wrote, I rose some preliminary objections to the idea of employee representation on corporate boards in the UK. I am not against strengthening the position of employees because I do not believe the current 'normative consensus' espoused by Hansmann and Kraakman: that the best way to achieve aggregate social welfare is through running the company in the collective interests of shareholders.

However, I noted that giving employees a voice on the board would be nothing more than a palatable political response because of the legal structure in companies it probably would not change the way companies operate. An employee representative would be under the same duties as any other director and it may cause new conflicts of interest or raise questions as to their independent judgement.

Now, fortunately, her government appears to have rowed back from this position and it is being reported instead that the proposed reforms will include:

1. Introduce corporate governance codes to private companies
2. Require companies to publish pay ratio between CEO chief executive and average employee
3. Improve effectiveness of remuneration committees and the extent to which they should consult shareholders and the wider company
4. Introduce binding votes on executive pay packages

The reasons behind this reform are, supposedly, to 'increase public trust in business in the face of the rise in anti-globalisation and anti-business sentiment'.

In response to this, the common objection is dusted off that more controls on business and boards will lead to some sort of mass exodus of top management talent from the country, just as there was a mass exodus from Britain after Brexit and America after Trump... as if the only thing tying management to this country is whether or not shareholders have a binding say on their pay.

Yet, what I object to under these proposals is the government's inability to think outside the box. Everytime, there is a scandal we hear the same story: "More shareholder power", that is the answer, despite seemingly ignoring considerable evidence that shows increasing shareholder power does not improve business.

There is the work from Cheffins that shows increase in investor confidence often comes from essentially soft forms of control rather than granting shareholders more rights.

There is work from Armour, Siems et al that shows increasing shareholder power in some cases decreases prosperity as it significantly relates to reduced public listings.

We must also consider some of the seminal work on agency theory by the likes of Fama, who highlighted matters such as portfolio theory. Shareholders diversify their risk and have little incentive to monitor one company. There is also the problem of information asymmetries between company and shareholder, that even if they did have the incentive they may not be properly informed to make good or fully informed decisions.

There is also the fact the government point to other countries' practices, such as the US, France, and Australia, but ignore work by Tubner that highlights the impact of developing legal systems by analogy or legal transplant can result in legal irritants as laws operate out of context. Not to mention using Australia as an analogy for legal development of strengthening shareholder power ignores there own reforms of removing the 100-member rule that allows 100 shareholders to table resolutions at annual general meetings.

Then you have my own current work (forthcoming, so don't want to give too much away just yet) that shows even if shareholders tried to legally enforce anything against the company, the courts are parsimonious in allowing shareholders to enforce the company's rights due to restrictions on locus standi.

So, I am not sure the case is really made out, that the way to improve public confidence in business is to give shareholders more power. It is built on a faulty premise that: (1) we trust shareholders to make the right decision, or any decision at all; and (2) the faulty premise that the best way to achieve aggregate social welfare is to run companies for the shareholders' collective interest.

This begs the question, of course, what should we do? Now, I have many angles I could take on this, but I draw attention to Cheffins' work on whether law matters, and I also draw inspiration from Schynder's recent paper on why should law matter.

It would appear that the objective of reforming the law, i.e. why should law matter, is to improve public confidence. It does appear there are other objectives, such as deterrence, but confidence appears to be the main concern. The reasons for this are highlighted in the news article such as 'good governance helps companies take better decisions, for their own long-term benefit and the economy overall'; and 'businesses are a pillar of our society, creating employment opportunities and contributing significantly to funding our country's public services'. Seemingly if we are confident in what businesses are doing we can rely on them and we as the public and consumers become more confident in the market and continue to spend.

Cheffins points to the different ways investor confidence is improved, noting this is not achieved through increasing their rights. Factors such as financial intermediaries and the stock exchange are better at achieving this.  One must stress that this looked at increasing investor confidence, so one must be careful in drawing an analogy between investor and public confidence. But from this observation our working hypothesis could be increased shareholder rights will reduce public confidence in business.

It is taken from this that increasing shareholder rights we would observe a decrease in public confidence in business. While I said it was a danger to draw analogies with investor confidence as to whether increased rights would reduce public confidence, the hypothesis can be supported by the idea that shareholders, with their lack of incentives, will fail to monitor the company properly to increase confidence; those that do monitor the company will only do so to increase their own personal wealth; and when things do turn sour shareholders will lack the appropriate legal mechanisms to enforce the desired standards through the courts or company resolution.

If we want to increase public confidence we need more imaginative ways of doing that. Now, I am openly in favour of good regulation of business. I am not necessarily going to say what regulation that should be, as I do not think it is a matter for company law, nor is there the space or time to do so here. But, for example, employment law could be strengthened to support the statement above. That we rely on business for employment opportunities. We are not going to be confident in business if we feel they can remove us from our role in favour of short-sighted profit. So getting the balance of employment law right can help increase confidence. Yet, this Conservative government has gone about restricting employment rights.

This then boils down to what I said previously, these reforms are nothing more than palatable political responses.

Wednesday, 10 August 2016

Employee Representation on Boards: Meaningful reform or a palatable policitcal response?

Theresa May has reignited the debate about whether boards should have employee representation. This will be similar to the practice on the continent in countries such as Germany, where worker participation is the norm in larger companies.

It is a response to tackle what many see going on in the corporate world as corporate greed, self-interest, malpractice and the like. Employee representation can help tackle this problem of immediate profit above all else by putting stakeholder interests at the heart of the company's decision making, referred to as the 'relational company' model. To this end, it is hoped we would see far fewer instances of the 'unacceptable face of capitalism'.

This is not all, it is part of an ongoing trend in company law reform to shift the burden from the state to internal measures to remedy corporate misfeasance. By placing control and decision making in the hands of those interested in the company they can rectify and/or remedy instances of corporate failure internally without the need for state interference.

So will employee representation really bring an end to profit above all else and radically reform corporate law? Here are some considerations as to why I think that answer would be 'no'.

One must first begin with 'what is the company'. It is a separate legal entity. It is the same as you or I are, legally speaking. Its differences are only practical. The same could be said of two natural persons, whereby legally they are treated the same as individuals but consist of practical differences. The end result is that the law seeks to adapt to those practical differences to remedy any potential unfairness whereby those practical differences cause an imbalance in any relationships one holds with another party. For example, a parent and a child are legally treated the same as individuals but hold practical differences. So when the two individuals engage in a relationship the law responds to account for those practical differences between the two individuals i.e. through aspects of family law.

Therefore, a company is able to own property, enforce its legal rights, have legal rights enforced against it and so on just as any other individual. But it cannot do this itself due to its practical limitations. It has no eyes to see, no ears to hear, no hands to write. It requires individuals to act for it. The right to do so is traditionally given to the directors. The right is derived from the company's constitution. Therefore it is the company, exercising its right, to allow another to act for it. Again, this is no different from, say, a natural person who does not have the capacity to act and requires someone to act for them, such as an individual with a severe disability.

So, how does the law respond to the practical differences where one is required to act for another? Anyone who undertakes to act for another's interests is recognised as owing them duties. A trustee will owe duties to beneficiaries. A director owes duties to the company. Equity imposes these duties to ensure the power the person has over the other is exercised in a manner society deems as 'proper'. In most instances this involves four key duties: 1) proper performance; 2) best interests; 3) care and skill; 4) loyalty. Arguably (1) is not a duty as it is simply an interpretation of the powers given to determine if they were exercised for the purpose given. But I do not want to get side tracked...

Therefore, the individual acting for the other, in this case our director, is acting in the other's interests, the company. Here we have the first issue with a relational model of the company. If one is to put the interests of the stakeholders at the heart of decision making, the law will only allow you to do that insofar as it is in the best interests of the company. Otherwise it would be treating the company differently from a natural person, which is not allowed. You could not legally force the company to put the interests of the stakeholders at the heart of the decision making process because it is tantamount to someone telling a natural person to put another's interests at the heart of their decision making process. The governance reform would then have no legal teeth. The law requires the directors to put the company's interests at the heart of the decision making process, not the stakeholders.

This then leads to the second problem. With its one-tier board the UK imposes the same duties on every director, whether they are an employee representative or not. Therefore, an employee representative can only put the employee's interests at the heart of the decision making process where it is in the interests of the company to do so. This further leads on to how an employee representative will be incentivised. The current remuneration packages of directors are all based on profit metrics that favour a shareholder-centric model of board governance. If employee's are incentivised in the same way, agency theory would tell us that they would only prefer the employee's interests as long as it favoured their own. If they are incentivised the same way as other directors, group-think would undoubtedly set in, as relying on the representative to make the decisions in the employee's interests where they stand to gain by making decisions against them is going to cause a considerable conflict of interests. The alternative is to incentivise them differently, which would artificially create a two tier board, which may very well cause division and split on the board rather than unity and cohesion.

This also shows that in the UK, we technically do have employee representation on boards already. The board are required to act in the company's best interests. What is the company's best interests will often involve a consideration of the effect decisions will have on stakeholders. But this is only one consideration for the board, as it would be for you or me when we make decisions. Ultimately it comes down to what is best for the company, but to legally require anything else would be a major shift in the way the company is perceived and treated.

The UK approach to the company is pragmatic. The company is a separate legal entity and anyone acting for it has to put its interests first to account for its practical limitations. It shows that May's proposal is a palatable political response in an attempt to shift company regulation away from the state to internal measures by giving workers a voice on corporate boards. The end result is that when the next corporate scandal hits, government can blame the company rather than the system. However, this shows that the governance reform is unlikely to do much to change the way a company is run and for whom because the law would not facilitate this change. If you want to less of the unacceptable face of capitalism, May needs to recognise the company as a separate legal entity and take measures to strengthen the rights of those involved with the company i.e. special legislation on zero-hour contracts; enforcing existing employee rights; easier means to enforce consumer rights; better standards on environment pollution; better standards on community projects and infrastructure. Simply expecting all these things to happen by putting an employee on the board and doing nothing else is beggar's belief.

A final thought is that developing employee representation in the UK on the basis of analogy, overlooks the corporate governance failings those jurisdictions have seen. It was only last year the Volkswagen scandal broke. No amount of employee or stakeholder representation stopped what the legal rules did little to prevent. Governance reform is not meaningful reform. If you want change you need to make it in the individual's interests to chose that method of behaviour. Plastic bags, smoking, alcohol, even Pokémon Go are recent examples of modifying behaviour and none of these changes relied on just telling people to behave in a different way.

Thursday, 4 August 2016

The Handbook of Board Governance

Coming towards the end of a busy period of work, the blog has been neglected.

What has been keeping me busy. First, the Handbook on Board Governance. I have been asked to review it for a journal. I am only a chapter in but it promises to provide some useful insight (despite one pet peeve of an author describing the director's fiduciary duties as loyalty and care - there is no fiduciary duty of care!)

I am also quite interested to read one chapter that claims separate legal personality and limited liability is being continually eroded through increased shareholder accountability. As far as I have observed that it is in fact the opposite.

I have also been working on my British Academy Quantitative Skills Award, as it draws to an end this month. I have learnt about using STATA, dummy coding, mediating hierarchy, moderation, sobel test, and logistic regressions. I have used these and applied them to my work on derivative claims. The paper is focusing on 'practical convergence or legal irritants in shareholder protection'. The statistical evidence reveals very little shareholder protection since the introduction of the Companies Act 2006, suggesting that the formal change of legal rules has done little to nothing to meet the objectives of the reform.

Therefore, we are likely to see plenty more select committees and legislation to rectify corporate misfeasance such as that from the BHS scandal, because internal company processes are ineffective in dealing with it. The unacceptable face of capitalism will continue. Employee representation on boards to deal with it? A palatable political response that will have no effect in the UK. It fails to address the actual problems that exist in employment law and properly recognise the company's separate legal status.

Finally, I am working towards finishing a new thesis on fiduciary duties. More to follow in due course on this.




Saturday, 4 June 2016

Can Companies Vote in the EU Referendum?

With the impending EU referendum, there is a natural drive to get those who can vote to register. Who can and cannot vote is not always straight forward, but the question here is whether companies can vote?

The answer is, of course, no. Thank-you very much for reading this post...

but this leads to another question, should companies be able to vote? So, on some quick research in to politics and the law on voting, a helpful comment from a colleague, pre existing knowledge of company law I will tackle this question.

To me, this question took on more pertinence after the decision in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34. It arguably has significance well beyond simply acknowledging the obscurity of piercing the veil. To summarise the decision, the court effectively held that the court will never pierce the corporate veil and hold those behind it responsible for the company's liabilities and obligations. Privity applies to companies as much as it does to you or me. Where the company is used as a vehicle to avoid personal liability and obligations, there is always an equitable tool on hand to hold the company liable in its own right. So in Prest, the husband's transfer of assets to the company were held on a bare trust in divorce proceedings for the wife. It did not have to hold the company liable for the divorce to recover the property, which would have been absurd.

What we see an emergence of here is that final step to full recognition of the company as a separate legal entity. Responsible completely by itself, with no lingering possibility of controllers being liable personally for the company's debts. Its limitations are merely practical, not legal. I often remember being taught in my undergraduate days that a company cannot drive a lorry, used as an example to demonstrate the limits to its legal liability. Whilst it is true that it cannot drive a lorry, this is not a legal limit, it is a practical one. It could still be liable, where that lorry crashes, for negligence, if they failed to train the driver properly, for example.

Therefore, something I often say to anyone who asks about company liabilities, rights, or obligations, if you find yourself treating the company differently than you would a natural person then you have done something wrong. For example, saying shareholders own the company is treating a company differently from a natural person, as you cannot own a person. A shareholder merely owns the share. Whilst the law may seek to regulate the company's relationships in a way that is responsive to nuances, that is no different from other relationships involving natural persons.

Therefore, now the company has been fully recognised as a separate legal person, completely responsible for its own rights, liabilities and obligations, should it not be able to vote on those issues that can affect those rights, liabilities and obligations?

Now, I am not pretending that there are not some obvious and strong arguments that they should not vote. Nor am I advocating that they should, simply exploring if they should. I am also hoping I am not completely ignorant of some reason why the shouldn't or can't vote in a way that makes this post seem more ridiculous than it might already appear. So let's review some of the arguments and authorities.

The starting point is that there is nothing that says a company cannot vote because the law sets out that citizens can vote and provides a, seemingly exhaustive, list of those who cannot, which does not include companies.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art 22 provides that a citizen is entitled to vote. Equally, who can vote has to be compliant with any Human Rights provisions. But who can vote has always been a national decision, so a 'citizen' is defined nationally under the British Nationality Act 1981. While a company might not, yet, be classed as a citizen, the legislation includes the ability to apply for citizenship. To apply there needs to be a 'real' connection and capacity. The latter would not be an issue, but the 'real' connection might be difficult, but if its registered office and place of incorporation is in the UK then this, or either, might be enough to establish a real connection.

The next step would be whether they are entitled to vote if they are a citizen. The Representation of the People Act 2000 bases this on citizenship, in line with Art 22, with no restrictions on companies.

Ignoring the existing law, one may consider whether the law should enable it to do so, if it currently does not permit it.

The policy argument is the one stated, if they are a separate legal person with its own capacity it should be able to have a democratic voice on how its position may be effected by political decisions.

Now there are obviously practical difficulties in voting as a company. In a referendum though it is a one off vote, not linked to any particular constituency. The directors, as the guiding mind of the company. The vote would need in the best interests of the company, compliant with Companies Act 2006, s.172.

Granting a person with legal capacity the right to vote would not be anything new, as there is precedent for it. Women over the age of 30 were granted the right to vote in 1918 and over 21 in 1928. Whilst companies were recognised as having separate legal status in 1897 in Salomon v Salomon (1897) AC 22, it was not until a few years ago that it was fully recognised that a company's controllers will not be liable for the company's obligations. Therefore, an argument advanced that 'why would companies be given the vote when women did not have it', cannot be sustained without question. A woman had clearly become a separate legal person with full legal capacity from their husband or the like, and should be given the vote. This was not as clear for companies. It is now after the decision in Prest.

One point is that allowing a company to vote would destroy the equality among citizens, regardless of wealth and education but they are equal for the purposes of the democratic principle. Yet, companies are of different size and wealth. They may be less or more powerful than an individual or another company. The principal 'one person, one vote' never said that person had to be natural.

Another is that certain companies may operate contrary to public policy. One argument presented is that a tobacco company's view cannot prevail as it should be restrained for health reasons. But on such logic you could ban any smoker from voting. That itself is contrary to the democratic process. Take a more concrete example and prison inmates' rights to vote. Their incarceration might be a result of a law they disagree with. Their right to vote for a politician that might support their release by overturning such a law should not be banned from voting. Therefore, a company should be entitled to vote to support their position, even if it runs contrary to the current public policy of the existing Parliament.

One practical problem is subsidiaries. How many votes should a group of companies get? If companies were to get votes, specialised rules would have to be set out to prevent abuse, with the democratic process eroded by faceless, shell companies dictating the direction of the legislature.

A historical point might offer some further pause for granting the vote to companies. It is the legislature who needs to control who votes. Otherwise it cannot be taken to be seen as supreme. Thus, when companies were granted that status, it was previously as a result of Royal Charter. Parliament, however, was the donor of the right to vote. Giving companies the right to vote would enable to Crown to reassert some power over voting, questioning Parliamentary supremacy. However, companies are now traditionally formed through registration with a public body, in the UK that is Companies House. Therefore, such companies registered would not undermine parliamentary supremacy. However, other type of companies, such as those formed under a Royal Charter should be denied such a right if companies were to be given one.

A final problem might be a result of a company's practical limitations. It cannot age per se and therefore could never reach the age of maturity to vote. Yet this could be overcome by adjudging its age by number of years since its incorporation.

Overall, the company, now with full legal capacity, has a case for the right to vote. If it were to be given a vote, it should be one vote, with certain restrictions. But it is arguably undemocratic to not allow one with full legal capacity to vote.

Any observations, always welcome to hear them.

Friday, 15 April 2016

Corporate law full circle, yet still inadequate?

"Other recommendations include a continuation of the present prohibition of no-par shares, a requirement that share premiums (paid-in surplus) be made unavailable for dividends, that secrecy as to corporate control be prevented by requiring disclosure of their identity by persons who are beneficial owners of substantial shareholdings, and that certain changes be made in the rules governing shareholders' meetings and in those which relate to winding-up of companies." (my emphasis added)


You might be forgiven for thinking that this is a quote about recently proposed company law reform. The reference to identifying beneficial owners of shares is a contemporary issue proposed to reduce the possibility of tax avoidance and evasion. Transparency being the panacea to all of life's problems, if you believe Transparency UK and Tax Research UK.


However, this is not a quote about the recent debate, it is in fact a response to the 1945 Cohen Report on Company Law Amendment by Professor Dodd at Harvard University in 1945 Harvard Law Review Vol 58 p1258. 71 years ago this was proposed and it was knocked back. Recent debate after the decision Eckerle [2013] EWHC 68 also raised questions not only about who beneficiaries were but also if they were sufficiently protected from investment intermediaries who legally hold the shares.


The response is, company law is not working sufficiently. Transparency of who owns these companies and shares, more liability on those who act for companies or shareholders.

Yet, far from me believing that transparency will resolve the matter, it is not even a company law problem and therefore, reforming company law will not solve the problem. The problem here is tax law.


Take, for a moment, that a register of beneficial shares is introduced. Who is actually going to be on that register? Will you or I be on that register as beneficiaries of shares invested in through our pension schemes? What about wealthy individuals in other jurisdictions where kidnapping and money laundering are much more prevalent? There would have to be some exceptions and a defined scope of what is disclosed, when and where. Those companies and trusts that are legitimately run should not be forced to disclose private wealth either, whether on or off shore. Those exceptions and scope will be exploited and do nothing to prevent individuals intent on avoiding or evading tax from doing so.


It is difficult to see why we should treat a company differently from a natural person. If we say all beneficial interests in shares have to be disclosed then why not force disclosure in other senses where a natural person may simply hold someone's wealth for them not through shares but through non-dom status or simply being domicile in a different jurisdiction? I speculate, but there are probably other ways of avoiding tax and a beneficial ownership register is unlikely to have much effect. It might deter some politicians and public figures and companies but for the majority of smaller fish, would we really be concerned? Would these bigger companies just not exploit other means minimising their tax liabilities?


Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 sort of brought us full circle in company law from Salomon v Salomon [1897] AC 22. A company is a separate legal entity, as recognised in Salomon but the question arose as to when those behind it could be liable for the company's obligations and liabilities. Essentially, the answer was never and this was the issue in Prest where it was all but confirmed that the company is responsible just like you or I for our obligations and liabilities, and the courts would not hold those behind the company responsible for the company's liabilities and obligations. Thus, even if there is a beneficial register, company law would not hold the beneficiaries liable for anything the company has done, so it is not company law that requires any reform. If you want to make these individuals liable it is tax law that requires reform. Arguably, tax law might not even need reform, since if the company is used to evade tax, which is unlawful, then the individuals would be liable in their own right. However, if they want to make tax avoidance unlawful then tax law needs to change. If they want to tackle tax evasion then there needs to be cross-border co-ordination on tax law. It is not company law that is inadequate.



Without going in to more detail, if there wants to be more enforcement then there needs to be better enforcement. Over the years the state has been taking a more hands off approach, expecting shareholders to do more but equipping them with no tools or incentives to do so. So all of a sudden the state is realising that they need to do something and improve their own enforcement powers. It was 1945 as well that Cohen recognised that shareholders were inadequate monitors and the Board of Trade (now BIS) had ineffective powers in the Companies Act 1929 to investigate misfeasance.


In short, one should take great caution in listening to the drum that Transparency UK and Tax Research UK are beating very loudly. These problems have come up before and just disclosing everything is not an appropriate answer. Their rhetoric is to marginalise anyone through brash language who does not agree with them, and do not adequately engage with criticisms or concerns. If you do not believe me about the brash language just listen to BBC Radio 4's Today show on the 15th April at 08:10 where Richard Murphy of Tax Research UK speaks and 12th April from 08:45 where Robert Barrigton of Transparency International UK speaks, both highly dismissive of any argument against transparency. Indeed Murphy argues that he is a Professor in International Political Economy, and contends markets operate better with greater transparency... well that is one argument, his professorship status has little to do with that though, and it certainly is not the case that full transparency makes for a better market, particular in a liberal market economy where competition is more important than a co-ordinated market economy. It is a problem with "rational" economics and economists. The fact is the argument for transparency is not as simple as market value and financial gain, maximising returns in the short term. It is a complex issue with competing interests and considerations that cannot be boiled down to 0s and 1s.


This has very much been the start of a new project and getting the ideas down. Let's see where this goes...

Thursday, 25 February 2016

WINIR Symposium Abstract Accepted

On 4th-6th April 2016 the second annual WINIR symposium will take place at Bristol University. The event symposium is focusing on 'Property Rights' of the corporation.

Property rights are a central institutional feature of all politico-economic systems where markets play a major role, and a key item of political controversy between liberal and socialist positions. The role of property rights in matters ranging from interpersonal exchange, power and innovation to corporate governance, privatisation and economic development is debated across several academic disciplines, including economics, history, law, philosophy, politics and sociology. The growing importance of intellectual and other intangible property in modern capitalism has further provoked important ongoing theoretical and policy discussions, part of which revolve around the very meaning of property as opposed to possession.

Together with Derek Whayman at Newcastle University we have had our abstract accepted on 'Property Rights and Equitable Principles: Understanding Fiduciary Loyalty in an Organisational Context'
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The abstract follows:

The property rights of an organisation are subject to equitable principles, namely fiduciary loyalty, that affect those property rights. Yet uncertainty over fiduciary loyalty persists. For example, it is unclear how a director’s fiduciary duty operates to a company and third parties, so if the director were to engage in a private enterprise, can any gains be retained by the organisation to become their property or are they  subject to the ownership rights of others? Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row stated that a ‘court should be very slow to introduce uncertainty in to commercial transactions by the over-ready use of equitable concepts’ but did not set down a test for when it would do so, meaning property rights of an organisation can be affected by the arbitrary introduction of fiduciary loyalty and does not clearly solve our private enterprise problem.

This paper builds on Graveson’s work on ‘from status to contract’. Previously, fiduciaries were defined by status, e.g. directors, agents and trustees. Loyalty is now said to arise via agreement, argued to varying degrees by Edelman, Finn and Lord Millett. However, we consider full contractualisation too simple to be accurate in determining the scope of fiduciary loyalty. This paper goes further to reduce the danger and uncertainty in organisational property rights by demonstrating its true basis: (i) first, loyalty is a non-contractual duty presumed in to a relationship where one undertakes responsibility for another’s interests in response to prophylactic concerns; (ii) this determines the scope of the duty of loyalty and status is wholly secondary; then (iii) the duty of loyalty is fine-grained to the specific contractual terms insofar as they permit what would otherwise be disloyalty. Loyalty is then not defined by contractual terms, it is subject to them.
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Whilst the paper has moved on slightly and our collaborative work focuses on understanding fiduciary loyalty more generally than in the organisational context, our core aim is to show the duty as fine grained to the intentions of the parties rather than positively implied in to the agreement. Thus we are critical of Edelman's approach that duties are effectively implied terms based on the reasonable expectations of the parties.

Thus for the purposes of our presentation we show when the organisation's property rights would be subject to a competing proprietary right or vice versa based on a clearer explanation of when the duty of loyalty is owed.

Friday, 2 October 2015

Volkswagen: Corporate law and governance failings?

Now, you might have been living under a rock if you have not noticed the on-going scandal, or perhaps disaster, at Volkswagen. Normally, a corporate scandal would not get me in enough of a bind to write a post about it, because it has become something of a regularity in one sector or another. So why have I merited this one for attention.

Well, it was after the comments from one of its directors, Olaf Lies, that I decided to write a short piece here. See here for a report and here for analysis. Yes, Mr Lies is one of VW's directors on the supervisory board. This is not the kind of stuff you can make up (albeit this BBC News reporter here humorously goes to great lengths to pronounce his surname how it should be, at around 1:20). It was his comments that particularly got me motivated.

My interest started when Martin Winterkorn, former CEO of Volkswagen, resigned in wake of the crisis stating that he was "not aware of any wrongdoing on my part" and was stepping down in the best interests of the company. He also noted he was "shocked" and the firm needed a "fresh start". Now I am pretty sure most articles on the subject of his resignation could have dispensed with such lengthy pieces to simply state: "shock horror! CEO denies knowing what is going on in the company...again". I for one have had enough of these CEO's claiming they knew nothing and desperately trying to cling to power! Remember Bob Diamond of Barclays anyone?

Many have commented on Winterkorn's attention to detail, so I would certainly agree that if he didn't know, he should have. He has also previously been VW's head of Group Quality Assurance and been in the car industry for over 20 years. But let's even say he genuinely did not know, what is he paid this much money for to do? (in case you were wondering, in 2014 Winterkorn received around 15m EUR in remuneration, see here and below). Selling cars is what VW do, and he did not know. When he found out, he described himself as shocked. At least stand up and acknowledge your own failings of not providing appropriate oversight within your company. It is the company you control and the buck stops there. The whole point of having separate legal personality for companies was to stop shareholders, who did not run the company, being personally responsible for the decisions of others. Yet here we have a controller denying responsibility for his own job and ultimately it is the shareholders feeling the pinch due to tumbling share prices.

Yet I get distracted. From Winterkorn then we get a statement from Mr Lies, claiming those responsible should be criminally liable. It might as well be an admission of guilt, or at least unlawfulness, because you as a board member are responsible for the company you control and the people you delegate to. It is you Mr Lies and other board members who must take responsibility for failing in providing that oversight. You are a supervisory board member, but where was the supervision for the 400,000 EUR that you receive? (NB: the majority of his fee does go to the state of Lower Saxony) Whilst others might have been complicit in the scandal it is another thing to try and shift all the blame on to the employees who were most likely working under onerous targets set by, yes, the board and senior managers.

Mr Lies openly admits to only having just found out about the problems in the "last board meeting". But Mr Lies is a well connected man as the economy minister of Lower Saxony where VW is based. Is it plausible for a man of his position not to have known. Perhaps he did not know because his workload is too demanding. Mr Lies hold 5 other directorships as well as being the economy minister and a board member at VW, see here. The German Corporate Governance Code permits a supervisory board member to have a maximum of 10 additional appointments but this must raise serious questions about that provision. Or perhaps the board was simply too large for anyone to do anything? The supervisory board has 20 members. If the company is forced to trim the fat surely it should start from the top? Perhaps I am optimistic in ignoring the fact the savings that will have to be made will be more likely borne by employees, shareholders, creditors and customers?

Sure Winterkorn has lost his position and Lies might lose his, but this is minor in comparison in respect of what will happen to these other groups of individuals. Lies still holds several other positions to supplement his income. Winterkorn is listed as a board member at Bayern Munich in VW's 2014 annual report. Not to mention his hefty remuneration again, is probably enough to keep him going, which I have copied here.

  MARTIN WINTERKORN
  Chairman of the Board of Management, Research and Development
     
€ 2014 2013
     
Fixed remuneration 1,617,025 1,486,525
Fringe benefits 300,453 421,337
Total 1,917,478 1,907,862
One-year variable remuneration 3,148,000 3,001,000
Multiyear variable remuneration 10,796,000 10,097,000
Business performance bonus (two-year period) 6,296,000 6,002,000
LTI (four-year period) 4,500,000 4,095,000
Total 15,861,478 15,005,862
Pension expense 0 0
Total remuneration 15,861,478 15,005,862


So in summation, corporate law and governance is exposed. Law in its failings to punish the right people, and governance for not incentivising people sufficiently.  

Monday, 8 June 2015

Corporate Governance: Theory, Reality, Policy

Thanks to the generous funding of the Social Science Arts and Humanities Research Institute (SSAHRI), in collaboration with Hertfordshire Business School, myself and Dr David Gindis have co-organised a workshop on Corporate Governance: Theory, Reality, Policy, which can be signed up for here

Details of speakers and the events can be seen in the programme image below.


Sunday, 8 March 2015

Grant Successes

Over the past few weeks I have received good news regarding my 2 grant applications with both being accepted in full.

The first success was from the Social Science, Arts and Humanities Research Institute at the University of Hertfordshire. This was a multidiscipline grant award to foster collaborative research between schools. The application was made with Dr. David Gindis from the Business School. The grant will help pay towards a one day workshop in May/June this week on 'Variety of Corporate Governance: Theory, reality and policy. I shall post updates here as an when I have them.

The second success was from the British Academy. This was for their Quantitative Skills Award, which enables me to work with a mentor on defined research projects that involve quantitative empirical analysis so as to enhance my skill set in this area. I will be working with Dr Chidiebere Ogbonnaya at the Eastern Academic Research Consortium.  The projects include furthering my analysis on derivative claims and enhancing my existing data set on non-executive directors, most likely with a comparative element. More to follow as and when. 

Saturday, 14 February 2015

LCCGE Presentation

Last Friday I presented my research at the London Centre for Corporate Governance and Ethics. It was a good experience and a good chance to publicise the work. The presentation is now available online and can be found here. 

Monday, 1 September 2014

WINIR Symposium Abstract Accepted

I have recently had my abstract accepted to present my research paper at next year's World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research (WINIR) Symposium taking place 22nd-24th April 2015 in Lugano Switzerland. My abstract is posted below. I will be presenting some of my research findings from my empirical study in to self-interest amongst non-executive directors. Its aim is to serve as a rebuttal of sorts to cool claims that greater involvement from non-executive directors will lead to better governance.

Abstract:

The governance of a company in England consists of a single board of directors comprising executives and non-executives. Executives run the company on a day-to-day basis, whilst non-executives oversee and participate in monitoring and strategy. Legal rules and corporate governance structures often focus on how the interests of the executives can be aligned with the interests of the company. Research also considers how effective these are. However, seldom is the focus on potential self-interest amongst non-executive directors. Their role has increased, as has their remuneration, creating greater opportunity for non-executives to use their position for self-interested means. Multiple appointments are common amongst non-executives and are a central feature of the corporate governance landscape. Yet they may also be a form of perquisite consumption, taken for the personal benefit of the non-executive or used advantageously to benefit one firm over another. Using multiple appointments as a proxy for self-interest this quantitative study investigates the governance mechanisms that may be used to control self-interest and the effect that these appointments may have on the governance of the firm. Using data collected from FTSE 100 companies at firm level over a five-year period 2006-2010, the study focuses on aspects such as remuneration, equity and agency problems as possible influences on the taking of multiple appointments. The study reveals that increased fees result in a greater amount of external appointments, as does a concentration of agency problems. The study also reveals that whilst equity may reduce external appointments it may be an insufficient control on self-interest. The impact of the study shows that propositions for greater non-executive involvement to enhance governance in the firm needs to be balanced against the current lack of controls on self-interest. Without such considerations greater involvement may not have the intended consequences.  

Monday, 28 July 2014

WINIR Call for Papers

The World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Researchers has a call for papers open, due to close this Thursday 31st July. The call for papers can be found here. The Symposium is due to take place 22nd-24th April 2015 at Universita della Svizzera Italiana (USI), Lugano, Switzerland.  

Friday, 20 June 2014

Leeds Conference on Accountability in Corporate Governance and Financial Institutions

Yesterday I attended a conference at the University of Leeds on Accountability in Corporate Governance and Financial Institutions. See here for the programme. The talks were very interesting and engaging with strong focus on what is meant by accountability and making people, mainly directors but also mention to owners, managers and creditors, accountable. 

Monday, 13 August 2012

Significant agency problems and multiple directorships

Part of my analysis on multiple directorships considers corporate governance theories such as agency theory and applies this against the issue of multiple directorships.

Agency theory in a nutshell is where somebody parts with control over their assets to the control of another due to, inter alia, an inability or unwillingness to deal with them personally. Inherent in such a relationship is the ability of the person in control to use those assets and the access to them to serve their own self-interest. In a corporate context the owner then must incur agency costs to align the interest of those in control with his own.

This is a premise for "good corporate governance" and what are the best ways, effectively, to minimise agency costs. Agency theory has developed a number of solutions to curtailing self-interest through a number of governance factors (alongside any existing legal deterrents to self-interest such as fiduciary duties). The theory identifies factors such as splitting the role of CEO and chair to two different individuals so no one individual controls the board, holding regular board meetings (as well as directors not missing too many), regular committee meetings such as the remuneration committee, executives not holding too many external appointments, a high level of independent directors to executives, high equity ownership from executives, high percentage of pay for performance element in compensation package, and a good sized board all as features of good governance.

These are just a few of potentially numerous agency problems in a firm but gives a good account of what is considered good governance according to the UK Corporate Governance Code.

The amount of agency problems present in any given firm may vary. Executives may be more able than others to impose higher agency costs. Agency theory would predict this is due to insufficient monitoring from the independent non-executives. A reason why non-executives are not monitoring effectively may be from their own external appointments that they have viewed them as a perquisite consumption due to the increasing value of remuneration available in such positions. Therefore one may predict that where a firm has more agency problems then the firm will also have a higher level of non-executives with more external appointments.

To test for this, indicator variables were created to show whether a firm had an agency problem from those just mentioned above (9 in total) and were collated. This figure was put in to a multiple regression model with other predictors (non-executive remuneration and non-executive equity) to predict the outcome of non-executive external appointments.

The first regression model did not demonstrate agency problems had a significant relationship with multiple directorships. However, to further this analysis the regression model was adapted to include each individual agency problem to identify whether there were any significant individual agency problems. Therefore the regression model included non-exec remuneration and equity as well as the 9 individual agency problems.

These results demonstrated that three agency problems (CEO-chair duality; board meetings missed; executive equity ownership) had a significant positive relationship with non-executive external appointments. Thus where a firm has these significant agency problems increasing then the non-executives will hold more appointments. There was also one significant negative relationship with the ratio of independent directors to executives. Thus where the ratio of independent directors to executives is greater the non-executives will hold fewer appointments.

Using these significant agency problems the final stage was to create dummy variables for each firm to indicate whether a firm had either 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 of these agency problems present in the firm. These dummy variables were then placed in to the regression model again with non-executive remuneration and equity to see if there were any significant results. The dummy variable for 0 and 4 factors were omitted since they were constant.

The results show that where the firm has more of these significant agency problems present the significance of the relationship to predicting non-executive multiple directorships also increases. As a result there is evidence available that agency problems increase the amount of external appointments for non-executives and executives are thus able to place more agency costs on the firm.


ModelUnstandardized CoefficientsStandardized CoefficientstSig.
BStd. ErrorBeta
1(Constant)13.0482.095 6.227.000
Non-Exec Remuneration per NED.000.000.2232.850.005
Equity held per Non-Exec (percent)-16.1544.186-.297-3.859.000
One significant agency problem1.9121.576.1191.213.227
Two significant agency problems2.4531.808.1281.357.177
Three significant agency problems7.0502.592.2292.719.007

Thursday, 21 June 2012

Directors' pay: Guide to government reforms: It is not transparency it is simplification

I am thinking these reforms are as watered down as I was on my way to work this morning. The government has published its report on directors' pay reform proposals.

These plans are to strengthen the hand of shareholders and increase transparency. Well I think transparency is the wrong word because that implies more disclosure. Well in fact most of what is being proposed is already disclosed in most if not all annual reports. What these proposals are, is at best simplification.

I do not think I have to discuss the proposal to give shareholders a binding vote to a great extent. This is simply a bad idea. The government has pandered to its audience that believe shareholders own the company and somehow employee the directors. Quite simply they don't. The company as a separate legal personality appoints directors to undertake responsibility for its assets. It is for the company to reward its directors, not the shareholders. But for this to remain viable and for there to be a reduction in agency costs there needs to be a body of independent directors who reward the executive directors who actively run the company. This is where the real problem has stemmed from. These independent directors only became prominent on boards when they became useful to the executives, i.e. through helping in strategy and advice. Supposed independent non-executives have become increasingly involved with the running and strategy of the company which reduces their independence.

Thus I remain unconvinced that shareholders deserve a stronger hand. They buy shares in a company, they do not own it. If they do not like what the bought then they can sell it.

If remuneration is going to be managed properly you need to ensure that the non-executives who are deciding on remuneration are truly independent. This does not mean all non-executives need to take a step back, just those deciding remuneration. The Corporate Governance Code or the Financial Reporting Council is suggesting to revise the Code with measures on restrictions in regard to executives sitting on remuneration committees at other companies. This is probably a positive step, but one from the FRC rather than the government proposals. See here for relevant links.

For some of the proposals...

It would be interesting to see how the government tries to disclose details of the directors' employment contracts. Their rights as an employee are separate for rights as a director. I am not quite sure if this is something that should be published in annual reports. More information needed though before further comment.

The proposals want details of what directors will get paid for performance that is above, below or on target. Well anyone who owns a calculator could figure that out from the annual report already. They are required to disclose the shares awarded in a particular year and share price they were awarded at. They also publish the criteria that performance is measured against at the percentage that will vest depending on what targets they meet. Some firms do in fact already publish an estimated value at maximum vesting of the awards.

Thus this point does highlight that it is simplification and not increased transparency.

They also want information on the change of profit, dividends and the overall spend on pay. Well yet again this information is available through the annual reports. It is just more simplification.

They also want material facts taken in to consideration when setting pay to be published. Well let us face it, that is not worth the paper it is written on. Not to mention in most cases companies do already publish this. BP for example after the oil spill detailed their consideration of that matter in awarding remuneration. It did not stop their chief executive resigning that year on a package worth well over £5million if I remember correctly. What is the Government expecting from this proposal. A declaration that they considered these wider interests and then ignored them anyway. Increased evidence of watered-down simplification.

Table B of the proposals in the report do not seem to have any differences from what is already required of companies in annual reports. The requirement of a total single figure of remuneration does require companies to publish a single figure that includes variable pay and pensions. Again, the trusty calculator could have already done this without the need for reform. Apparently this figure will be calculated using a methodology complied by the FRC to include actual pay earned rather than potential pay awarded. However, the report does not clarify how this will then encompass pensions since this is never pay earned and is merely a debt on the company's balance sheet.

These are early days though. The next steps are for the government to bring forward reforms to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill as well as publishing revised Regulations setting out what companies must publish on directors' pay.

Thursday, 10 May 2012

Multiple Directorships across the EU

Below is a table I have constructed regarding multiple directorship or interlock restrictions imposed by corporate governance codes across the European Union.

Some countries may have restrictions imposed by statute which are not included in the summary below.

With non-executive restrictions on multiple directorships/interlocks the general trend appears to be a simple statement of "enough time to fulfil duties". For executive restrictions though they appear to be more stringent with most limiting director external appointments to just one or two.

Some countries appear not to impose any limits such as Sweden and Poland. It is important to remember though that restrictions may be imposed by statute and figures have also shown that in 2001 Sweden had 100% director disclosure of external appointments.


Member State
Exec restrictions
Non-exec restrictions
AUSTRIA
Para 25 - w/o approval from supervisory board no member of management board is permitted to assume a mandate on a supervisory board
Para 26 – shall not hold more than 4 supervisory roles (chairs count double)
Para 56 – No more than 8 mandates (chair counts double)
Para 57 – If serving on a management board of a listed company may not hold more than 4 supervisory roles (chair counts double)
BELGIUM
N/A
Para 4.5 – should not consider taking on more than five directorships
BULGARIA
Para 3.6 - Company by-laws should limit the amount allowed
Para 3.6(one tier)/3.7(two tier) - Company by-laws should limit the amount allowed
CYPRUS
N/A
N/A
CZECH REPUBLIC
Ch VI para 16 – Participation in too many boards can interfere: but no limit
Ch VI para 16 – Participation in too many boards can interfere: but no limit
DENMARK
N/A
Para 5.7 – member of supreme governing body who is also on the executive board should not take on more than a few non-executive positions or one non-exec and one chairmanship
ESTONIA
Para 2.2.2 – No more than 2 other management board positions; shall not be a chair of a supervisory board
Para 3.2.3 – Enough time to perform duties
FINLAND
Rec 9 - Possible to devote a sufficient amount of time to discharge of duties, considering secondary occupations
Rec 9 - Possible to devote a sufficient amount of time to discharge of duties, considering secondary occupations
FRANCE
Part II Para B.5 - Not in favour of cross-directorships unless for strategic alliances
Part II Para D.2 - Recommended limit of five non-exec positions or two exec
Part II Para D.2 – Recommended limit of five non-exec positions or two exec
GERMANY
Para 5.4.5. – Should not accept more than three positions on supervisory boards
German Stock Corporation Act section 100 – Members of the supervisory board should not take on more than 10
Para 5.4.5. – Members must have enough time to fulfil duties
GREECE
Para 4.2 – Board Members should not sit on the board of more than five other listed companies
Para 4.2 – Board Members should not sit on the board of more than five other listed companies
HUNGARY
Para 2.4.2 – When accepting further functions or nominations it is the board members’ duty to ensure they are able to perform their duties in relation to the current board membership
Para 2.4.2 – When accepting further functions or nominations it is the board members’ duty to ensure they are able to perform their duties in relation to the current board membership
IRELAND
(Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings CIIU) – Para 7.7 – No more than five additional appointments of other CIIUs; Para 7.8 – No more than eight additional appointments of non-CIIUs
(Corporate Governance Code for Credit Institutions and Insurance Undertakings) Para 7.7 – No more than five additional appointments of other CIIUs; Para 7.8 – No more than eight additional appointments of non-CIIUs
ITALY
Para 1.C.2-3 – Must devote enough time to fulfil duties. The board shall impose any limits differentiating depending on the type of the role i.e. executive or non-executive
Para 1.C.2-3 – Must devote enough time to fulfil duties. The board shall impose any limits differentiating depending on the type of the role i.e. executive or non-executive
2.P.3 – Devote enough time to ensure their judgement may have a significant impact on the taking of board’s decisions
LATVIA
Para 4.3 – Enough time to fulfil their duties
Para 7.2 – Should have enough time to fulfil duties and act in the interests of the company
LITHUANIA
Para 4.7 – Devote sufficient time to fulfil their duties
Para 4.7 – Devote sufficient time to fulfil their duties
LUXEMBOURG
Rec 2.9 – Should accept no more than one other non-executive appointment and not be a chairman of more than one other listed company
Rec 2.9 – Should devote sufficient time to fulfil duties and only accept a limited amount. Should not be a chairman of more than one listed company
MALTA
Para 1.7.3 – Allocate sufficient time to their duties
Para 3.8 – Allocate sufficient time to their duties and limit the number of directorships held in other companies
NETHERLANDS
Para 2.1.8 – Must not be a member of more than two supervisory boards, nor may they be a chairman of a supervisory board
Para 3.3.4 – Maximum number of appointments limited to five. Chairmanships count double
POLAND
N/A
N/A
PORTUGAL
N/A
N/A
ROMANIA
N/A
N/A
SLOVAKIA
Section V n 5 – Several directorships can disrupt efficiency. The company should assess if these directorships are compatible with efficient performance of the board’s activities
Section V n 5 – Several directorships can disrupt efficiency. The company should assess if these directorships are compatible with efficient performance of the board’s activities
SLOVENIA
14.2 – Should inform the supervisory board immediately of any appointment to a supervisory board
Para 7.1 – sufficient time for the role
Para 8.6 – should make an objective assessment of their ability to perform duties in relation to the scope of existing duties
SPAIN
Para 26 – Devote sufficient time and effort to perform their duties. Companies themselves should lay down any rules or limits on external directorships
Para 26 – Devote sufficient time and effort to perform their duties. Companies themselves should lay down any rules or limits on external directorships
SWEDEN
N/A
N/A
UNITED KINGDOM
Para B.3.3 – No more than 1 additional non-executive appointment on a FTSE 100 board
Para B.3.2 – All directors should allocate enough time to discharge their duties